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Tenure, Experience, Human Capital, and Wages:  
A Tractable Equilibrium Search Model of Wage Dynamics †
By Jesper Bagger, François Fontaine,  
Fabien Postel-Vinay, and Jean-Marc Robin *
We develop and estimate an equilibrium job search model of worker 
careers, allowing for human capital accumulation, employer het-
erogeneity, and individual-level shocks. Wage growth is decom-
posed into contributions of human capital and job search, within 
and between jobs. Human capital accumulation is largest for highly 
educated workers. The contribution from job search to wage growth, 
both within and between jobs, declines over the first ten years of 
a career—the “job-shopping” phase of a working life—after which 
workers settle into high-quality jobs using outside offers to generate 
gradual wage increases, thus reaping the benefits from competition 
between employers. (JEL J24, J31, J63, J64)
Our main objective in this paper is to quantify the relative importance of human 
capital accumulation and imperfect labor market competition in shaping individual 
labor earnings profiles over the working life. We contribute to the empirical litera-
ture on wage equations along three broad dimensions.
The first one relates to Mincer’s (1974) original specification of log-earnings as a 
function of individual schooling and experience. In their review of Mincer’s stylized 
facts about postschooling wage growth in the United States, Rubinstein and Weiss 
(2006) list human capital accumulation and job search as two of the main driving 
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forces of observed earnings/experience profile.1 As these authors note, the obvious 
 differences between those two theories in terms of policy implications (concerning 
schooling and training on one hand and labor market mobility on the other) moti-
vates a thorough quantitative assessment of their relative importance. Rubinstein’s 
and Weiss’s detailed review of the available US evidence lends support to both lines 
of explanation, thus calling for the construction of a unified model. This article 
offers such a model.
Existing combinations of job search and human capital accumulation include Bunzel 
et al. (1999); Rubinstein and Weiss (2006); Barlevy (2008); Burdett,  Carrillo-Tudela, 
and Coles (2011); Yamaguchi (2010); and Veramendi (2011). Although these con-
tributions have features not included in this article, none simultaneously allows for 
worker and firm heterogeneity, idiosyncratic productivity shocks, and human capital 
accumulation. Furthermore, none uses Matched Employer-Employee (MEE) data on 
both firm output and worker wages, which are required to ensure that inference on 
rent sharing mechanisms does not rely solely on the model’s structure.
Introducing individual shocks into a sequential job search model with a wage set-
ting mechanism that is both theoretically and descriptively appealing turns out to be 
a difficult undertaking, tractable only in special cases (see Postel-Vinay and Turon 
2010; Moscarini and Postel-Vinay 2013; Robin 2011). Barlevy (2008) chooses 
to sacrifice theoretical generality for a realistic process of individual productivity 
shocks. He restricts the set of available wage contracts to piece-rate contracts, stipu-
lating what share of output is received by the worker in lieu of wage. In this article, 
we follow Barlevy’s lead and assume piece-rate contracts. However, our model and 
empirical analysis differ from Barlevy’s in two main dimensions.
First, we use MEE data and put strong emphasis on both firm heterogeneity and 
individual productivity shocks, whereas Barlevy uses NLSY data and, thus, cannot 
separate between different sources of heterogeneity. Second, he follows the Burdett 
and Mortensen (1998) tradition and assumes that each firm posts a unique and constant 
piece rate.2 We instead assume that piece rates are renegotiated as workers receive out-
side offers as in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), and the extensions in Dey and Flinn 
(2005) and Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006). It is now understood that wage 
posting fails to describe the empirical relationship between wages and productivity 
because the relative mildness of between-employer competition toward the top of the 
productivity distribution inherent to wage posting models implies that those models 
require implausibly long right tails for productivity distributions in order to match the 
long right tails of wage distributions (Mortensen 2005; Bontemps, Robin, and van den 
Berg 2000). By allowing firms to counter outside offers, the sequential auction frame-
work of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) intensifies firm competition and produces a 
wage equation that fits well the  empirical relationship between observed firm output 
and wages (see Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin 2006 and the results therein).3
1 Rubinstein and Weiss also point to learning about job, worker, or match quality as a third potential determinant 
of life-cycle earnings profiles. Learning is formally absent from our structural model. It is difficult to tease out of 
wage data what is due to learning about unobserved productivity characteristics from true productivity dynamics.
2 He does not endogenize the distribution of piece rates. Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2011) work out the 
full equilibrium version of the model but do not estimate it.
3 Yamaguchi (2010) also uses a sequential auction framework augmented with bargaining. However, like 
Barlevy, he uses NLSY data to estimate his model. The lack of separate data on productivity and wages makes 
his bargaining power estimates depend on functional form assumptions. Another difference is that he allows for 
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Our second contribution is to inform the debate on the effect of job tenure ver-
sus that of experience on wage growth. The available empirical evidence on that 
important question is mixed. Some papers find large and significant tenure effects, 
while others estimate them small or insignificant (see Abraham and Farber 1987; 
Altonji and Shakotko 1987; Topel 1991; Dustmann and Meghir 2005; Beffy et al. 
2006; Buchinsky et al. 2010). This literature emphasizes the inconsistency of ten-
ure effects estimated by OLS, owing to a composition bias: in a frictional labor 
market, jobs that are more productive in some unobserved way should both last 
longer and pay higher wages. Differences between papers then mainly come down 
to different choices of instruments. Those choices are based on sophisticated theo-
retical arguments which are often laid out without the help of a formal model, thus 
inevitably leaving scope for some loose ends in the reasoning. For example, with 
 forward-looking agents, wage contracts should reflect expectations about firms’ and 
workers’ future outside options, which are not precisely defined outside of an equi-
librium model. Moreover, estimation often relies on strong specification assump-
tions, such as Topel’s assumed linearity of the relationship between log wages and 
match quality, on one side, and tenure and experience, on the other. Again, formal 
theory can give us a handle on whether these assumptions are reasonable or not.
Search theory provides a powerful framework to understand why and how wages 
increase with firm tenure. Firms that face the basic moral hazard problem of work-
ers being unable to commit not to accepting attractive outside job offers have an 
incentive to backload wages in order to retain their workforce. Under full firm 
commitment (and with risk-averse workers), this backloading takes the form of 
wages increasing smoothly with tenure, as shown by Burdett and Coles (2003).4 
We instead follow Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and assume that firms do not 
commit over the indefinite future but revisit the piece rate they pay a worker each 
time the worker receives an attractive outside offer, implying that the worker’s piece 
rate also increases with tenure, albeit stochastically and in discrete steps, in response 
to competitors’ attempts to poach the worker. The contract-posting model of Burdett 
and Coles has predictions that are very close (although not entirely identical) to 
ours. What makes us favor the offer-matching approach in this article is mainly 
tractability and amenability to estimation: the Burdett and Coles model is very hard 
to solve in the presence of firm heterogeneity, whereas firm heterogeneity (a key 
feature of the data) is a natural ingredient of our model.
A related issue is whether we should explicitly distinguish between general 
and firm-specific human capital. In the empirical literature, firm-specific human 
capital is a somewhat elusive concept generally associated with positive returns 
to tenure. However, as pointed out by Lazear (2003), the truly firm-specific com-
ponents of human capital5 are unlikely to be as important as the general compo-
nent. Lazear explains upward-sloping wage/tenure profiles and the occurrence 
 match-specific productivity shocks when we introduce a richer pattern of heterogeneity, with persistent worker-
specific shocks to ability. Lastly, our model is considerably easier to simulate and estimate, thanks to the piece-rate 
contract assumption.
4 Burdett and Coles (2010) extend their earlier 2003 paper by allowing for human capital accumulation and 
piece-rate contracts, as in Barlevy (2008) and here.
5 Quoting Lazear: “knowing how to find the restrooms, learning who does what at the firm, and to whom to go 
to get something done,” etc.
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of job-to-job mobility with wage cuts by an argument combining search fric-
tions, firm heterogeneity, and multiple skills used in different combinations by 
different firms. However, multiple skills are not necessary to the argument. As 
already mentioned, a combination of search frictions and moral hazard explains 
upward-sloping wage/tenure profiles. Moreover, allowing for heterogeneity in 
productivity among firms makes voluntary job changes consistent with wage 
losses: if the poaching firm is sufficiently more productive than the incumbent 
one, the promise of higher future wages will induce the worker to accept a lower 
initial wage. In the interest of parsimony, we thus restrict our model to one single 
dimension of general human capital and test its capacity to replicate standard mea-
sures of tenure and experience effects.
The third body of empirical work related to the present article is the voluminous 
literature on individual earnings dynamics. The long tradition of fitting flexible sto-
chastic decompositions to earnings data has proven very useful in documenting the 
statistical properties of individual earnings from a dynamic perspective (see Hall 
and Mishkin 1982; MaCurdy 1982; Abowd and Card 1989; Topel and Ward 1992; 
Gottschalk and Moffitt 2009; Browning, Ejrnaes, and Alvarez 2010; Meghir and 
Pistaferri 2004; Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi 2005; Altonji, Smith, and Vidangos 
2013). The overwhelming majority of papers in that literature focus solely on wages 
and are silent about how productivity shocks impact wages.6 Our model offers a 
simple theoretical structure within which to think about the impact of firm-level 
productivity heterogeneity on within- and between-firm wage dynamics and the 
transmission of individual productivity shocks to wages.
Our model’s main output is a structural wage equation similar to the standard 
“Mincer-type” equation, with worker and employer fixed effects, human capital 
effects, and stochastic dynamics caused by (i) between-firm competition for the 
workers’ services (activated by on-the-job search) and (ii) individual productivity 
shocks that help explain the frequent earnings cuts that we observe.7 In addition, 
the model permits a decomposition of average monthly wage growth into the con-
tributions of human capital accumulation and of job search, within and between 
jobs.
We estimate our structural model using indirect inference on separate MEE sam-
ples of Danish workers with low, medium, and high levels of education, respec-
tively. The model fit is good, and the estimated model replicates conventional 
measures of labor market transitions, tenure and experience effects, and residual 
wage dynamics well. The decomposition of individual wage growth is qualitatively 
similar across education groups but reveals that more educated workers have higher 
total wage growth. This reflects both more rapid human capital accumulation and, 
at the early stage of a worker’s career, higher returns to job search. Both human 
capital accumulation and job search contribute to the concavity of wage-experience 
profiles. The contribution from job search to wage growth, both within and between 
jobs, declines within the first ten years of a career, a period that we identify as the 
6 One notable exception is Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2005), who take a reduced-form look at the extent to 
which firm-level shocks to value added are transmitted to wages in Italian MEE data.
7 When we write wage, we mean annual earnings. Most datasets, and administrative data are no exception, gener-
ally do not distinguish between contractual wage and bonuses. A lot of the observed earnings cuts may, in fact, be 
cuts in bonuses.
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 “job-shopping” phase of a working life. After that initial period, workers settle into 
high-quality jobs and use outside offers to generate gradual wage increases, thus 
reaping the benefits from competition between employers. Indeed, the within-job 
component always dominates the between-job component, but especially so after 
ten years of labor market experience.
Additional model-based decompositions of means and variances of log wages, 
conditional on experience level, reveal that the wage-experience profile is almost 
entirely explained by human capital accumulation and an increasing mean employer 
productivity (due to “job shopping”). Among highly educated workers, human 
capital accounts for about half of the accumulated growth at all experience levels. 
The weight of human capital is smaller among workers with medium or low educa-
tion (a fifth to a quarter). Cross-sectional log-wage variance is increasing with labor 
market experience at a declining rate (in the data and in the model). This is almost 
entirely driven by increased dispersion in employer productivity. The level of log-
wage variance is explained for the most part by dispersion in both employer produc-
tivity and piece-rate contracts, the contributions of dispersion in worker ability and 
individual productivity shocks being comparatively small.
We further find that conventional measures of returns to tenure (based on linear 
log-wage regressions) conceal substantial heterogeneity between different workers 
in the same firm and between similar workers in different firms. This heterogeneity 
arises because workers with different labor market histories differ in their ability 
to appropriate match surplus from a given employer, and because more productive 
employers can get away with offering lower starting wages (and higher subsequent 
wage growth) than less productive employers.
The article is organized as follows. In Section I we spell out the details of the 
theoretical model, and in Sections II, III, and IV we present the data, the economet-
ric model, and the estimation protocol. In Sections V and VI we discuss estimation 
results including the structural model’s fit to the data, and in Sections VII and VIII 
we analyze decompositions of individual wage-experience and wage-tenure pro-
files. Section IX concludes.
I. The Model
We consider a labor market where a unit mass of workers face a continuum of 
firms producing a multipurpose good, which they sell in a perfectly competitive 
market. Workers can either be unemployed or matched with a firm. Firms operate 
constant-return technologies and are modeled as a collection of job slots that can 
either be vacant and looking for a worker, or occupied and producing. Time is dis-
crete and the economy is at a steady state.
A. Production and Timing of Events
Let t denote the number of periods that a worker has spent working since leaving 
school. Call it experience. Log-output per period,  y t = ln  Y t , in a firm-worker match 
involving a worker with experience t is defined as
(1)   y t = p +  h t ,   h t = α + g (t) +  ε t ,
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where p ∈ [  p min  ,  p max  ] is a fixed firm heterogeneity parameter and  h t is the amount 
of efficient labor the worker with experience t supplies in a period; it is the sum of 
three components: α is a fixed worker heterogeneity parameter reflecting permanent 
differences in individual productive ability, g(t) is a state-dependent deterministic 
trend reflecting human capital accumulation on the job, and  ε t is a zero-mean shock 
that changes only when the worker is employed. At this point we do not attach any 
more specific interpretation to the  ε t shock. It reflects stochastic changes in indi-
vidual productivity that may come from preference or technological shocks, or from 
public learning about the worker’s quality. This shock is worker specific, and we 
restrict it only to follow a first-order Markov process. A useful benchmark may be 
to think of it as a linear AR(1) process, possibly with a unit root.
Note that this specification implies that firm productivity p and human capital  h t 
are complementary in production. A central planner would thus want to reallocate 
workers as they accumulate human capital.
At the beginning of the period, for any employed worker,  ε t is revealed, the work-
er’s experience increases from t − 1 to t, and her productivity is updated from  h t−1 
to  h t as per equation (1). We assume that unemployed workers do not accumulate 
experience, so that if a worker becomes unemployed at an experience level of t − 1, 
her experience t − 1 and productivity  h t−1 stagnate for the duration of the ensuing 
spell of unemployment. In the first period of the next employment spell, experience 
increases to t, and productivity changes to  h t .
At the end of the period any employed worker leaves the market for good with 
probability μ, or sees her match dissolved with probability δ, or receives an outside 
offer with probability  λ 1 (with μ + δ +  λ 1 ≤ 1). When a match is dissolved, we 
allow for the possibility that the worker finds a new employer right away, without 
an intervening unemployment period, an event that occurs with probability κ. This 
is a simple way of modeling the transition patterns observed in the data. With a 
slight abuse of terminology, we refer to κ as a reallocation probability. In reality, the 
(unconditional) probability of reallocation, an involuntary job-to-job transition, is 
δκ. It follows that the probability that a match is dissolved and the worker enters the 
state of unemployment is δ(1 − κ). When unemployed, a worker finds a new match 
with probability  λ 0 (such that μ +  λ 0 ≤ 1). Upon receiving a job offer, any worker (regardless of her/his employment status or human capital) draws the type p of the 
firm from which the offer emanates from a continuous, unconditional sampling den-
sity f  ( · ) =  F ′ ( · ), with support  [   p min  ,  p max  ] .
B. Wage Contracts
Wages are defined as piece-rate contracts. If a worker supplies  h t units of efficient 
labor and produces  y t = p +  h t (always in log terms), he or she receives a wage 
w t = r + p +  h t , where R =  e r ≤ 1 is the endogenous contractual piece rate.
The rules governing the determination of the contractual piece rate are adapted 
from Dey and Flinn (2005) and Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006). Consider 
a worker with experience level t, employed at a firm of type p under a contract 
stipulating a piece rate of R =  e r ≤ 1. Denote the value that the worker derives from 
being in that state as V(r,  h t , p), with experience t kept implicit in the state vector 
to simplify the notation. This value is an increasing function of the worker’s current 
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and future wages and, as such, increases with the piece rate r and the employer’s 
productivity p (see below for a formal verification of that statement). Also note that 
a piece rate of R = 1 (or r = 0) allocates all of the match output to the worker and 
leaves the employer with zero profit from that particular match. The maximum value 
that a worker can hope to extract from a match thus equals V(0,  h t , p).
As described earlier, the worker contacts a potential alternative employer with 
probability  λ 1 at the end of the current period. The alternative employer’s type  p′ is 
drawn from the sampling distribution F( · ). The key assumption is that the incum-
bent and outside employers bargain over the worker’s services, based on the infor-
mation available at the end of the current period. In particular, the idiosyncratic 
shock  ε t+1 , determining human capital  h t+1 for period t + 1, is not known when the 
new contract is negotiated. The outcome of the bargain is such that the firm that val-
ues the worker more—i.e., the firm with higher productivity—eventually hires (or 
retains, as the case may be) the worker.
Suppose for the time being that the dominant firm is the poacher (that is, suppose 
p′ > p). Then the poacher wins the bargain by offering a piece rate r ′ defined as the 
solution to the equation
(2)  E t V ( r ′ ,  h t+1 ,  p′ ) =  E t  { V (0,  h t+1 , p) + β  [ V (0,  h t+1 ,  p′ ) − V (0,  h t+1 , p) ] } ,
where  E t designates the expectation operator conditional on the available informa-
tion at experience t—here  ε t+1 in  h t+1 is the only random variable to integrate out 
conditional on  ε t —and where β ∈  [ 0, 1 ] is a fixed, exogenous parameter. The domi-
nant firm  p′ thus attracts the worker by offering, in expected terms, the value of the 
match with the dominated type-p firm plus a share β of the additional worker rent 
brought about by the match with the type- p′ firm. We refer to β as the worker’s bar-
gaining power.8
If  p′ ≤ p (the poacher is less productive than the incumbent), then the situation 
is a priori symmetric in that the incumbent employer is able to profitably retain the 
worker by offering a piece rate  r ′ such that
   E t V ( r ′ ,  h t+1 , p) =  E t  { V (0,  h t+1 ,  p′ ) + β  [ V (0,  h t+1 , p) − V (0,  h t+1 ,  p′ ) ] } .
Note, however, that  p′ may be so low that this would not even entail a wage (or a 
piece-rate) increase from the initial r. Such is indeed the case whenever the poach-
er’s type  p′ falls short of the threshold value q ≡ q(r,  h t , p), defined by the indiffer-
ence condition
(3)  E t V (r,  h t+1 , p) =  E t  { V (0,  h t+1 , q) + β  [ V (0,  h t+1 , p) − V (0,  h t+1 , q) ] } .
If  p′ < q(r,  h t , p), the worker simply discards the outside offer from  p′ .
8 Strictly speaking, we cannot directly invoke the Nash bargaining solution to rationalize (2) because of our 
assumption that workers have logarithmic utility. Yet Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) rationalize (2) as the 
equilibrium of a strategic bargaining game adapted from Rubinstein (1982), which does directly apply to the case 
in this article.
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The above rules dictate the way in which the piece rate of an employed worker is 
revised over time. Concerning unemployed workers (who contact an employer with 
probability  λ 0 ), and employed workers whose job is destroyed but who immedi-
ately contact a new employer (with probability κ), we consistently assume that they 
receive a share β of the expected match rent. The piece rate  r 0 thus obtained by an 
unemployed worker with experience level t solves
(4)   E t V ( r 0 ,  h t+1 , p) =  V 0 ( h t ) + β  E t  [ V (0,  h t+1 , p) −  V 0 ( h t ) ] ,
where  V 0 ( h t ) is the lifetime value of unemployment at experience t.
We assume that unemployment is equivalent to employment in the least produc-
tive firm of type  p min  :  V 0 ( h t ) =  E t V(0,  h t+1 ,  p min  ). The implication is that an unem-
ployed worker accepts any job offer she receives. In an environment with search 
frictions, human capital accumulation, and different arrival rates on- and off-the-job, 
the reservation strategy of an unemployed worker would, in general, depend on the 
worker’s experience level. This complication would cause a loss of analytical tracta-
bility. The assumption of a constant reservation productivity (equal to  p min  ) is partly 
justified by empirical findings of the offer acceptance rate of unemployed workers 
being close to one (see, e.g., van den Berg 1990).
C. Solving the Model
We assume that the workers’ flow utility function is logarithmic and that they are 
unable to transfer wealth across dates. Let ρ denote the discount rate. The typical 
employed worker’s value function V(r,  h t , p) is then defined recursively as
(5)  V(r,  h t , p) =  w t +  δ(1 − κ) _1 + ρ   V 0 ( h t )
 +  δκ _ 
1 + ρ   ∫  p min   p max   E t  [ (1 − β) V 0 ( h t ) + βV(0,  h t+1 , x) ] dF(x)
 +   λ 1  _ 
1 + ρ   ∫ p 
 p max 
  E t  [ (1 − β)V(0,  h t+1 , p) + βV(0,  h t+1 , x) ] dF(x)
 +   λ 1  _ 
1 + ρ   ∫ q(r,  h t , p) 
p
  E t  [ (1 − β)V(0,  h t+1 , x) + βV(0,  h t+1 , p) ] dF(x)
 +  1 _ 
1 + ρ  [ 1 − μ − δ −  λ 1  _ F  ( q (r,  h t , p) ) ]  E t V(r,  h t+1 , p),
where  
_ F = 1 − F (the survivor function),  w t = r + p + α + g(t) +  ε t and the 
threshold q( · ) is defined in (3).
The worker’s value is the sum of current-period utility flow  w t and next-period 
continuation value, discounted with factor 1/(1 + ρ). The continuation value has the 
following components: with probability δ(1 − κ), the worker becomes unemployed, 
a state that he values at  V 0 ( h t ). With probability δκ, the worker’s job is dissolved, 
but she manages to immediately obtain a new offer from a type-x employer, drawn 
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from the offer distribution F(x). Bargaining with this employer, with unemployment 
as an outside option, results in value  E t [ (1 − β) V 0 ( h t ) + βV(0,  h t+1 , x) ] . With prob-
ability  λ 1 , the worker receives an outside job offer emanating from a type-x firm 
drawn from F(x), and one of three scenarios applies: the poaching employer may be 
more productive than the worker’s current type-p employer (x ≥ p), in which case 
the worker expects to come out of the bargain with value  E t [ (1 − β)V(0,  h t+1 , p) + βV(0,  h t+1 , x) ] . Alternatively, the poaching employer may be less productive than p 
but still worth using as leverage in the wage bargain ( p ≥ x ≥ q(r,  h t , p)), in which 
case the worker expects to extract value  E t [ (1 − β)V(0,  h t+1 , x) + βV(0,  h t+1 , p) ] . 
Finally, the offer may not even be worth reporting (x ≤ q(r,  h t , p)), in which case 
the worker stays with her initial contract with updated human capital, which has 
expected value  E t V(r,  h t+1 , p). With probability μ, the worker leaves the labor 
force permanently and receives a value of 0, and with complementary probability 
1 − δ − μ −  λ 1 , nothing happens and the worker carries on with her initial contract 
with updated human capital (expected value  E t V(r,  h t+1 , p)).
In Appendix A we make use of equation (5) to show that equation (3) has a sim-
ple, deterministic (indeed constant), consistent solution q(r, p) implicitly defined by
(6)  r = − ∫ 
q(r, p) 
p
 ϕ (x) dx,  ϕ (x) = (1 − β)  ρ + δ + μ +  λ 1  
_ F (x)  __ρ + δ + μ +  λ 1 β  _ F (x)  .
Now even though (6) implies no direct dependence of q( · ) on t or  h t , other, 
 nondeterministic solutions to (3) may still exist if agents expect future values of 
q( · ) to depend on future values of h. We will ignore the possibility of such sophisti-
cated expectational mechanisms in this article, and concentrate on this deterministic 
solution.
D. The Empirical Wage Process
Under the deterministic solution (6), the (log) wage  w it earned by worker i hired 
at a firm with productivity  p it at time t is defined as follows:
(7)   w it =  α i + g (t) +  ε it +  p it −  ∫  q it   p it  ϕ (x) dx,
where  q it is the type of the last firm from which worker i was able to extract the 
whole surplus in the bargaining game. This wage equation implies a decomposition 
of individual wages into five components: an experience effect g(t), a worker effect 
α i , a transitory worker productivity shock  ε it , an employer effect  p it , and a random 
variable  q it relating to the most recent wage bargain. The worker’s wage is equal to 
her marginal productivity if  q it =  p it , that is if she managed to force her employer to 
compete with an equally productive poacher.
The joint process governing the dynamics of ( p i, t+1 ,  q i, t+1 ) can be characterized 
as follows. If the worker is employed at time t, then with probability μ she retires, 
and with probability δ(1 − κ) she becomes unemployed, in which cases the value of 
( p i, t+1 ,  q i, t+1 ) is set to missing; otherwise the worker may experience a  reallocation 
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with probability δκ or draw an outside offer with probability  λ 1 . Hence, given ( p it ,  q it ), ( p i, t+1 ,  q i, t+1 ) is drawn from the following distribution:
(8) (  p i, t+1 ,  q i, t+1 ) = 
⎧⎥⎥⎥⎨⎥⎥⎥⎩
(·, ·), with probability μ + δ(1 − κ)
(  p it , q), ∀q ∈ ( q it ,  p it ],  with density  λ 1 f  (q)
( p,  p it ), ∀p >  p it , with density  λ 1 f  ( p)
( p,  p min ), with density δκf  ( p)
(  p it ,  q it ), with probability  
1 − μ − δ −  λ 1  _ F ( q it ).
If the worker is unemployed in period t, then (  p i, t+1 ,  q i, t+1 ) = ( p,  p min ) with density λ 0 f  ( p).
Our model conveys natural interpretations of the wage returns to experience and 
tenure. Experience has both a direct causal impact on wages through human capi-
tal accumulation, reflected in the term g(t) in (7), and an indirect effect through 
employed job search and the fact that, because of voluntary job-to-job transitions, 
more experienced workers tend to be higher up the job ladder—i.e., they tend to be 
in higher-p jobs. Tenure, on the other hand, has no direct causal impact on wages, 
but it has an indirect effect through the fact that, conditional on employer type p, 
workers with longer tenure tend to have received more outside job offers, and there-
fore to be on a higher piece rate based on a higher value of q.
All three stochastic components of wages (  p it ,  q it , and  ε it ) are unobservable in 
standard worker panel datasets. Moreover, both  q it and  p it are correlated with ten-
ure: workers are harder to poach out of matches with high-p firms, which therefore 
tend to last longer. According to our model, tenure will be positively correlated 
with wages in a cross-section because employers are forced to increase wages to 
retain their employees when they are approached by competitors. Moreover, start-
ing wages immediately following a voluntary job-to-job mobility will be correlated 
with tenure in the previous job because any successful poacher had to compete with 
an incumbent employer to hire a worker: workers poached out of high-p firms tend 
to have both longer past tenure and higher starting wages after a job-to-job mobility. 
The latter statement is not true if the worker moves to another job following a match 
dissolution shock with no intervening unemployment. In this case the type of the 
previous employer is not relevant for the observed starting wage; see (4).
E. Steady-State Equilibrium
The bilateral wage determination process described above pins down wages as 
functions of four random variables, namely, worker experience t, worker ability  α i , 
and two employer types  p it and  q it . Our final task is to characterize the equilibrium 
allocation, i.e., the joint distribution of (t,  α i ,  p it ,  q it ) that prevails in equilibrium. 
To that end, we follow the majority of the job search literature and assume that the econ-
omy is at a steady state, i.e., that the equilibrium allocation remains stable over time.
Under the steady-state assumption, equilibrium distributions can be derived 
from flow-balance equations reflecting the equality of flows in and out of various 
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aggregate stocks. The steady-state cross-sectional distribution of (t,  α i ,  p it ,  q it ) is 
derived in Appendix A. Especially useful for what follows are the equilibrium mar-
ginal distribution of firm productivity  p it across employed workers, denoted as L( p), 
and the equilibrium distribution of  q it given  p it , denoted G(q | p). We establish in 
Appendix A that
(9)  L ( p) =  (μ + δ)F( p)  __ μ + δ +  λ 1  _ F ( p) ,  and  G (q | p) =  [  μ + δ +  λ 1  _ F ( p)  __μ + δ +  λ 1  _ F (q)  ] 2 
for p >  p min and q ∈  [  p min  , p ] .
Let us derive the equation for L( p) as an example. L( p)(1 − u) is the stock of 
all employees at firms with productivity less than p. The exit rate from that stock is 
μ + δ(1 − κ) + (δκ +  λ 1 ) _ F ( p), where δ(1 − κ) is the transition rate into unemploy-
ment, and δκ +  λ 1 is the overall job-to-job mobility rate, adding reallocation shocks 
to voluntary employer changes. So [μ + δ(1 − κ) + (δκ +  λ 1 ) _ F ( p)]L( p)(1 − u) 
is the outflow from the stock of employed workers at firms of productivity p or 
less. The inflow into that same stock has two components: first,  λ 0 uF( p) initially 
unemployed workers receive offers from firms with types less than p in the period. 
Second, δκ[1 − L( p)](1 − u)F( p) workers initially employed at firms with types 
greater than p are reallocated to firms with types less than p. The total inflow into the 
stock L( p)(1 − u) of workers employed at firms with productivity p or less is thus 
λ 0 uF( p) + δκ[1 − L( p)](1 − u)F( p). Further, using the steady-state flow equation 
for unemployment, which implies that  λ 0 uF( p) = [μ + δ(1 − κ)](1 − u), we can 
rewrite that total inflow as  { μ + δ(1 − κ) + δκ[1 − L( p)] } (1 − u)F( p). Finally, 
equating the inflow with the outflow yields the above expression for L( p).
Another property of the equilibrium allocation is that worker ability  α i is uncor-
related with employer type. In other words, the model does not generate sorting 
on unobservable worker and firm types in equilibrium. This happens despite the 
existence of a complementarity between worker type α and firm type p in produc-
tion (the match output is multiplicative in α and p). Two important assumptions are 
driving this property. First, all matches contribute additively to total firm output, so 
that the productive type of an additional recruit does not affect output from existing 
matches. This is a very strong assumption, but adding complementarities between 
employees in production makes the determination of wages and the dynamics of the 
distribution of worker types within a firm extremely difficult to solve. Second, the 
value of a vacancy is zero, and the flow value of nonemployment and the flow output 
of a match with any firm are both proportional to worker ability. This assumption 
makes the surplus of a match multiplicative in worker ability, and the decisions to 
leave unemployment (positive surplus) or to change employer (go for the higher 
surplus) become independent of worker ability.
Any departure from these two assumptions will generate endogenous sorting in 
equilibrium and will complicate the equilibrium solution tremendously. Yet, we 
can still obtain sorting without changing the model by making the job finding rates 
( λ 0 ,  λ 1 , κ) functions of worker ability  α i . Then the distribution of  p it given  α i takes 
the same form as above with  κ i = κ( α i ) and with  λ i = λ( α i ). If, say, more able 
workers are also more efficient at job search, and therefore have higher job contact 
probabilities  λ i and  κ i , they will climb the job ladder faster and, thus, tend to be 
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employed in more productive firms than less able workers. We will use this exten-
sion in the empirical analysis.
II. Data
We estimate our model using a comprehensive Danish Matched 
Employer-Employee (MEE) panel covering the period 1985–2003. The backbone 
of these data is a panel of individual labor market histories (the spell data), which 
combines information from a range of public administrative registers and effectively 
covers the entire Danish labor force in 1985–2003. Spells are initially categorized 
into one of five labor market states: employment, self-employment, unemployment, 
nonparticipation, and retirement.9 The data are weekly and firm- (not  establishment-) 
level.
We supplement the spell data with background information on workers, firms, 
and jobs from IDA, an annual populationwide (age 15–70) Danish MEE panel con-
structed and maintained by Statistics Denmark from several administrative registers. 
IDA provides us with a measure of the average hourly wage for jobs that are active 
in the last week of November, and a worker’s age, gender, education including grad-
uation date from highest completed education, labor market experience, and own-
ership code of the employing establishment.10 The information on workers’ labor 
market experience refers to the workers’ actual (as opposed to potential) experience 
at the end of a calendar year. Experience is constructed from workers’ mandatory 
pension payments ATP and goes back to January 1, 1964.11
Finally, we use information on firms’ accounts collected by Statistics Denmark 
in annual surveys in 1999–2003.12 The accounting data essentially contain the 
sampled firms’ balance sheets, along with information on the number of worker 
hours used by the firm, from which we can compute value added. The survey covers 
approximately 9,000 firms which are selected based on their workforce size (see 
Appendix B for details on the sampling scheme).
These three sources of information are linked via individual, firm, and estab-
lishment identifiers. Even though the datasets are of large scale and complexity, 
matching rates are high, indicating the high quality and reliability of our data. 
On average, a last-week-of-November cross-section contains 3.6 million workers 
and 130,000 firms (of which, on average, 8,700 have accounting data information 
in 1999–2003).
To weed out invalid or inconsistent observations, reduce unmodeled heterogene-
ity, and to select a population for which our model can be taken as a reasonable 
approximation to actual labor market behavior, we impose a number of sample 
selection criteria on the data (see Appendix B for details). We try to steer clear of 
9 Nonparticipation is a residual state which in addition to out-of-the-labor-force spells captures imperfect take-up 
rates of public transfers, reception of transfers not used to construct the spell data, and erroneous start and end dates.
10 Ownership allows us to identify private sector establishments.
11 ATP is a mandatory pension scheme for all salaried workers aged 16–66 who work more than eight hours per 
week that was introduced in 1964. ATP savings are optional for the self-employed. ATP effectively covers the entire 
Danish labor force.
12 The survey was initiated in 1995 for a few industries and was gradually expanded until its 1999 coverage 
included most industries with a few exceptions such as agriculture, public services, and parts of the financial sector 
(source: Statistics Denmark).
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labor supply issues by focusing on males that are at least two years past graduation. 
Then, we  discard workers born before January 1, 1948, as those workers may have 
accumulated experience prior to the period for which we can measure experience 
(from 1964 onwards, see footnote 11). The maximum age in the data thus increases 
from 37 in 1980 to 55 in 2003. Conveniently, this also makes our sample immune 
from  retirement-related issues. We further combine the five labor market states listed 
above into three (employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation) by truncating 
individual labor market histories at entry into retirement, self-employment, the pub-
lic sector, or any industry for which we lack firm-level value added data. Finally, we 
stratify the sample into three levels of schooling, based on the number of years spent 
in education: 7–11 years (completion of primary school), 12–14 years (completion of 
high school, or vocational education) and 15–20 years (bachelor level or higher). The 
dataset is structured such that there is one observation per worker per year per spell.
We refer to the 19-year-long (unbalanced) panels of individual labor market his-
tories thus constructed as “Master Panels.” The fact that we observe individual labor 
market histories over a long period of time, coupled with information on actual labor 
market experience, as well as employer ID and measures of employer productivity, 
makes this particular dataset ideal for identifying and estimating our model fea-
turing on-the-job search, human capital accumulation, and two-sided heterogene-
ity with productivity shocks. Few other datasets would allow this type of exercise. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the Master Panels.
III. The Econometric Model
We shall estimate a different model for each education group that we treat as 
different labor markets with different workers and different employers. Education 
is assumed exogenous. There is no decision regarding education or human capital 
accumulation (except that workers take into account that unemployment freezes 
human capital accumulation). We shall thus estimate a different distribution of 
worker and firm heterogeneity for each skill market. We now describe the specifica-
tion of the structural parameters without indexing them on education, but it should 
be understood that all parameters are education- or skill-specific.
The matched employer-employee data provide log-wage observations  w ic for a 
sample of workers indexed by i and calendar time c, observations of log output 
(value added) per worker  y jc for a sample of firms indexed by j and time c, and a link 
function j = J(i, c) assigning an employer j to worker i at time c.
The model above provides a detailed description of the dynamics of individual 
wages. However, it says nothing about the dynamics of firm output. In the absence 
of a fully convincing model of the firm, we assume that log output per worker  y jc can 
be expressed as a function of firm heterogeneity  p j via a simple linear relationship,
(10)   y jc =  χ 0 +  χ 1  p j +  z jc ,
where the idiosyncratic output shock is assumed i.i.d. normal:  z jc ∼  (0,  σ p 2). We 
can afford this extra couple of parameters  ( χ 0 ,  χ 1 ) , as the sampling distribution 
of  p j , F, is partially identified by wages: first, the minimum value of  p j ,  p min  , is 
related to reservation wages (the value of unemployment is by assumption the value 
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of a job with type  p min ); second, all wages in a firm j, per unit of human capi-
tal, are bounded above by  p j . The sampling distribution of firm types is assumed 
Weibull: F( p) = 1 − exp(−[ ν 1 ( p −  p min) ]  ν  2  ), where the location parameter  p min  , the 
scale parameter  ν 1 , and the shape parameter  ν 2 are three parameters to be estimated. 
We shall estimate different parameters  ( χ 0 ,  χ 1 ) as well as different distributions of 
p j for each education group. We thus assume perfect substitutability between work-
ers both between and within skill groups.
As for worker human capital, it is such that the distribution of permanent worker 
heterogeneity α is normal  (0,  σ α 2 ). Individual-specific productivity shocks follow 
a Gaussian AR(1) process:  ε it = η  ε i, t−1 +  u it , with  u it ∼  (0,  σ ε 2). The determinis-
tic trend is cubic: g(t) =  γ 1 t +  γ 2  t 2 +  γ 3  t 3 .
We allow for worker-level heterogeneity in transitions rates by specifying  λ 0 , κ, 
and  λ 1 as deterministic functions of α (and keep δ independent of worker abil-
ity, which is a normalization). Specifically, we assume that  λ 0 = (1 − μ) λ 0 ′ , δ = (1 − μ) δ′ , and  λ 1 = (1 − μ)(1 −  δ′ ) λ 1 ′ with
   λ 0 ′ =  exp  ( λ 00 +  λ 01 α )   __    [ 1 + exp  ( λ 00 +  λ 01 α ) ]  ,
   λ 1 ′ =  exp  ( λ 10 +  λ 11 α )   __    [ 1 + exp  ( λ 10 +  λ 11 α ) ]  ,  κ =  
exp  ( κ 0 +  κ 1 α )   __  [ 1 + exp  ( κ 0 +  κ 1 α ) ]  ,
where ( λ 00 ,  λ 01 ,  λ 10 ,  λ 11 ,  κ 0 ,  κ 1 )′ are structural parameters to be estimated.
The parameters thus introduced, plus workers’ bargaining power β, constitute the 
structural parameter vector to be estimated. We do not estimate the discount rate ρ 
or the attrition rate μ, which we instead calibrate prior to estimation.
IV. Estimation Procedure
We estimate the structural model by indirect inference (Gouriéroux, Monfort, 
and Renault 1993), separately for three different education groups: 7–11 years 
of education, 12–14, and 15–20.13 The indirect inference estimator is a simulated 
method of moments procedure where the “moments” to be matched may include 
13 See Altonji, Smith, and Vidangos (2013) for another recent application of indirect inference to a different 
dynamic wage and job mobility model.
Table 1—Summary Statistics on Master Panels
Ed. 7–11 Ed. 12–14 Ed. 15–20
Number of observations 2,534,203 4,344,288 663,362 
Number of workers 168,649 320,638 66,155 
Number of firms 66,787 113,813 24,792 
Number of firms w/accounting data 9,874 16,361 6,570 
Number of employment spells 405,171 958,676 142,194 
Number of unemployment spells 536,722 502,418 59,423 
Number of nonparticipation spells 475,814 443,458 57,378
Source: Matched employer-employee data obtained from Statistics Denmark.
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parameters from reduced form econometric models, or possibly misspecified, but 
 easy-to-estimate, econometric models “resembling” the structural model. These are 
referred to as auxiliary models. The econometrician then seeks the structural param-
eter vector that minimizes the distance between the auxiliary models as estimated on 
real data and the same auxiliary models estimated on simulated data. The statistical 
properties of the indirect inference estimator is worked out in Gouriéroux, Monfort, 
and Renault (1993), to which we refer the reader for details.
Details of the algorithm used to simulate the structural model are given in Appendix C. 
It is worth noting that key steady-state equilibrium outcomes, e.g., the structural wage 
equation, and the endogenous distributions of observables and unobservables, e.g., 
t, p, and q, can be obtained analytically (see Appendix A). We can therefore impose 
equilibrium conditions directly in the simulation at each estimation step.
The choice of auxiliary models is a key and sometimes controversial step in indi-
rect inference estimation. Our selection of auxiliary models partly reflects the link 
between our structural analysis and the empirical labor literature on wage equations. 
Specifically, we combine the following four sets of moments.
A. Labor Market Mobility
We fit survivor functions for each type of spell and transition. Unemployment 
spells may end with a transition into a job, or be right censored. Employment spells 
may end with a transition into unemployment, a transition into another job, or 
be right censored. We account for competing risks and right censoring by using 
 Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survivor function for each spell type as follows. We 
stock-sample the Master Panel at a given point in time and record N residual dura-
tions. Then, taking job-to-job transitions as an example, let   EE (τ) be the set of spells 
at risk of ending in a job-to-job transition at duration τ. We have |   EE (0) | = N. 
Moreover, let   EE (τ) be the set of spells that do end in a job-to-job transition at 
duration τ. The Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survivor function relating to job-to-job 
transitions, denoted   SEE (τ), is given as
(11)    SEE (τ) =  ∏ 
s=1
τ
  |   EE (s) | − |   EE (s) |  __ |   EE (s) |  .
Job-to-unemployment (EU) and unemployment-to-job (UE) survivor functions are 
obtained analogously. In the empirical implementation we stock-sample the Master 
Panel in the last week of November 1998 and include as moments to be matched 
1 −   S(12),   S(12) −   S(24), and   S(24) −   S(36) for each of the three types of transi-
tion we consider. For a given distribution of worker heterogeneity α, the labor mar-
ket mobility moments identify the parameters in the transition probabilities  λ 0 ,  λ 1 , δ, and κ. We argue below that the distribution of worker heterogeneity is identified 
from data on individual wages.
B. Mincer Wage Equations
The auxiliary Mincer wage regression is estimated on a panel of repeated annual 
(last week of November) cross-sections of employed workers extracted from the 
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Master Panel. We include only spells that are not left censored ( jobs starting after 
January 1, 1985). Let i index individuals, and let c index the annual  cross-sections. Let 
j index firms, and let J (i, c) be the firm ID of worker i’s employer in  cross-section c. 
The log wage regression we consider is
(12)   w ic =  ∑ 
k=1
3
  ξ 1k  s ic k +  ∑ 
k=1
3
  ξ 2k  t ic k +  ψ i +  φ J(i, c) +  u ic ,
where  w ic is the log-wage,  s ic is job tenure, and  t ic is labor market experience. Tenure 
and experience enter via cubic polynomials. The parameters  ψ i and  φ j are unob-
served time-invariant worker and firm effects, and  u ic is the residual.
We estimate the parameters relating to tenure and experience by applying 
 within-firm OLS to (12). Firm and worker effects are subsequently recovered from 
the resulting residuals in two steps (firm effects first, then worker effects). We nor-
malize the empirical distribution of worker effects to have zero mean.
We include in the set of moments to match the estimated tenure and experience 
profiles, and the first four moments of the distributions of firm effects  (employment 
weighted), worker effects, and residuals. Finally, to further describe wage dynamics, 
we select sequences of consecutive within-job wage residuals (from spells contain-
ing at least five consecutive observations) and include residual autocovariances of 
order up to four over these observations. These moments convey information about 
the structural human capital accumulation function g( · ) (via the wage-experience 
profile in (12)), the sampling distribution F( · ) of firm types faced by job seekers 
(via the distribution of firm effects), the distribution of worker  heterogeneity α, and 
the individual-level productivity shock process ε.
C. Within-Job Wage Growth
We further consider the autocorrelation structure of within-job wage growth, 
which is what the estimation of statistical models of earnings dynamics is typically 
based on (see, e.g., Browning, Ejrnaes, and Alvarez 2010). For convenience, we con-
dition the analysis on worker i staying in the same firm between experience levels t 
and t + 1 and estimate the following auxiliary model for within-job wage growth:
(13)  Δ w ic =  ζ 1 +  ζ 2 Δ t ic 2 +  ζ 3 Δ t ic 3 + Δ u ic .
Neither equation (12) nor (13) has a structural interpretation: according to our struc-
tural model, this pair of equations is a misspecified representation of the individual 
earnings process, and one should therefore not expect it to be consistent in any 
particular way.
The auxiliary wage growth equation is estimated by OLS on the subsample of 
job spells with at least two consecutive annual wage observations. We include the 
estimated slope parameters, the standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of the 
residuals, as well as the residual autocovariances up to the fourth order in the set of 
moments to match. These moments contribute to the identification of the structural 
human capital accumulation function g( · ) and the individual-level productivity 
shock process ε.
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Comparison between the within-job wage dynamics described by the 
 first-difference equation (13) and the equation in levels (12) further conveys infor-
mation on the bargaining power parameter β. As will be established in Section VII, 
the bargaining power parameter β governs the magnitude of the response of wages 
to a job change—i.e., to a change in employer type p—, and to the receipt of an out-
side job offer not causing a job change—i.e., to a change in the random variable q in 
equation (7). Tenure effects and wage changes upon employer changes should thus 
convey information on β.
D. Firm-Level Value Added
We finally include in the set of moments to match summary statistics of the dis-
tribution of value added, employment, and mean wage across firms, weighing each 
firm observation by the inverse of the sampling probability. We also include the 
standard deviation of the growth rate of output per worker to identify the variance 
of the output shock  z jc .
V. Model Fit
A. Labor Market Mobility
Table 2 reports annual transition probabilities based on (11). Our structural model 
replicates the observed job-to-job transition probabilities almost exactly and also 
offers a reasonable fit to job-to-unemployment transition probabilities, especially 
for highly educated workers. It has some difficulty explaining the strong duration 
dependence in job-to-unemployment transition rates among low-educated workers. 
Yet, duration dependence in unemployment-to-job transition rates is well captured 
by our model, although the fit is markedly better for groups of workers with low and 
high education levels.
B. Mincer Wage Equations
Figure 1 shows the experience and tenure profiles of individual wages as esti-
mated from the Mincer-type auxiliary wage regression, equation (12). Solid lines 
depict profiles based on real data, while dashed lines relate to model-generated data. 
Finally, moments of the firm and worker fixed effect distributions—again based on 
the auxiliary wage regression—are reported in Table 3.
Both experience and tenure profiles are correctly picked up by our structural 
model, albeit with a slight tendency to overstate the degree of concavity of those 
profiles. Wages are positively correlated with experience in all three subsamples 
(second row in Figure 1). These correlations are quantitatively rather modest for 
the low-educated group, and become more substantial at higher education levels. 
The auxiliary wage regression also indicates a moderate, yet positive, correla-
tion between wages and tenure in all three subsamples (second row in Figure 1). 
The accumulated “returns to tenure” thus measured is about 5 percent after five 
years in a job in all education groups. Past five years of tenure, the wage-tenure 
profiles flatten out, especially among workers with low and intermediate education.
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Table 2—Fit of the Survival Functions: Destination Specific (Simulated and Real)
Ed. 7–11 Ed. 12–14 Ed. 15–20
Sim. Real Sim. Real Sim. Real
Unemployment-to-job transitions
 1 − SUE (12) 0.3576 0.3735 0.2810 0.5372 0.3540 0.3759(0.0097) (0.0103) (0.0249)
 SUE (12) − SUE (24) 0.0665 0.0385 0.1206 0.0506 0.0518 0.0492(0.0044) (0.0050) (0.0124)
 SUE (24) − SUE (36) 0.0470 0.0176 0.0763 0.0176 0.0391 0.0241(0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0097)
Job-to-job transitions
 1 − SEE (12) 0.1346 0.1646 0.1738 0.1787 0.2121 0.2086(0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0024)
 SEE (12) − SEE (24) 0.1083 0.1137 0.1284 0.1201 0.1507 0.1319(0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0020)
 SEE (24) − SEE (36) 0.0866 0.0767 0.0967 0.0905 0.1098 0.1188(0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0020)
Job-to-unemployment transitions
 1 − SEU (12) 0.0518 0.0953 0.0331 0.0544 0.0251 0.0325(0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0010)
 SEU (12) − SEU (24) 0.0502 0.0470 0.0330 0.0291 0.0249 0.0211(0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0010)
 SEU (24) − SEU (36) 0.0464 0.0392 0.0308 0.0250 0.0234 0.0174(0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0010)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors computed by bootstrapping the variance-covariance matrix 
of the real moments (10,000 replications).
Table 3—Auxiliary Wage Regression (Simulated and Real)
Ed. 7–11 Ed. 12–14 Ed. 15–20
Sim. Real Sim. Real Sim. Real
Firm effects
 Mean 4.9106 4.9012 5.0095 4.9998 5.1971 5.2224
(0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0040)
 Standard deviation 0.1690 0.1609 0.1614 0.1480 0.1767 0.1788
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0010)
Worker effects
 Standard deviation 0.1166 0.1190 0.1291 0.1362 0.1678 0.1683
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0009)
Residuals
 Standard deviation 0.1325 0.1380 0.1282 0.1344 0.1403 0.1455
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0005)
Within-job residual autocovariance
 Order 1 0.0018 0.0023 0.0015 0.0024 0.0018 0.0028
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
 Order 2 −0.0009 −0.0001 −0.0006 0.0001 −0.0007 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
 Order 3 −0.0013 −0.0013 −0.0011 −0.0010 −0.0013 −0.0012
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
 Order 4 −0.0012 −0.0016 −0.0011 −0.0014 −0.0013 −0.0016
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors computed by bootstrapping the variance-covariance matrix 
of the real moments (10,000 replications). The estimated slope coefficients on tenure and experience, and fit to third 
and fourth moments of distributions, are available on request.
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Next, turning to Table 3, comparison of the firm and worker effect distribu-
tions across education groups hints at some degree of positive sorting on educa-
tion, whereby more educated workers tend to be hired at firms with higher mean 
unobserved heterogeneity parameter. (This particular interpretation is, of course, 
conditional on the normalization of the mean worker effect at zero in all samples.) 
Moreover, dispersion of worker (and, to a smaller extent, firm) effects tends to be 
slightly higher among more educated groups. Except for first-order residual wage 
autocovariances, which are underestimated, all numbers in Table 3 are accurately 
replicated by the structural model. We do not report or comment on the fit to third- 
and fourth-order moments of the distributions of firm and worker effects, and resid-
uals (these moments are available on request).
C. Wage Growth
Results from the auxiliary wage growth equation (13) are reported in Figure 2, 
which plots the wage-experience profiles estimated from that equation both on real 
(solid line) and simulated (dashed line) data. Table 4 further reports parameter esti-
mates and moments of the residual distribution, including the autocovariance struc-
ture of wage growth residuals.
The profiles in Figure 2 combine the effects of tenure and experience within a job 
spell. As one would expect based on results from the wage equation in levels, these 
profiles are upward sloping for all education groups and steeper for more educated 
workers. Again, this pattern is very well captured by the structural model, although 
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the structural model slightly underestimates those experience profiles, especially in 
the high education group.
In Table 4, the second-order moment of the distribution of residual wage growth 
is well captured by the structural model (the mean being normalized at zero). 
Residual autocovariances decline sharply between one and two lags and are essen-
tially zero at longer lags. As is typically found in studies of individual earnings 
dynamics based on individual or household data, this is suggestive of a low-order 
MA structure. Our structural model is once again able to replicate this feature of 
the data.
D. Firm-Level Value Added
Results from the auxiliary equation (10) linking firm productivity and value added 
data are displayed in Table 5, which reports moments of the employment-weighted 
distributions of log hourly value added, individual wages, as well as the standard 
deviation of within-job annual growth in log value added per FTE worker.
Overall, actual data exhibit a considerable amount of dispersion in average log 
labor productivity. As one would expect based on the estimated wage regressions 
presented above, the education-specific log-wage distributions are also clearly 
ranked in terms of mean and dispersion, with higher-educated workers having higher 
average wages and higher dispersion as well. The fact that average log wages exceed 
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average log value added among the high-educated workers is due to the fact that 
output per worker is calculated for the entire workforce, including both skilled and 
unskilled workers. It is, thus, an artifact of not observing the relevant productivity 
parameter p. Note that the simple relationship between structural labor productivity 
p and value added is sufficiently flexible to capture this feature of the data. The fit 
to the marginal distributions of log value added and wages is overall good. The fit to 
the standard deviation of within-job changes in log hourly value added is also good. 
This moment pins down the stochastic shock to the proposed relationship between 
structural labor productivity p and log hourly value added.
Finally, wages and value added are positively correlated. The structural model 
does capture the sign of the correlation but overestimates its magnitude considerably.
VI. Structural Parameter Estimates
We now discuss structural parameter estimates, except for the monthly discount 
rate ρ = 0.0050 and attrition probability μ = 0.0018, which were both fixed prior 
to estimation.
A. Worker Heterogeneity
Table 6 contains the estimated standard deviation of the distribution of the 
time-invariant component of worker heterogeneity, α, which we interpret as fixed 
innate worker ability. Within-group dispersion in ability is increasing from low- 
to high-educated workers. Interestingly, the structural model has a lower variance 
of the person effect than the auxiliary Mincer equation. This is likely due to the 
fact that the person effect in the auxiliary equation captures the persistence gen-
erated by the AR(1) idiosyncratic shock  ε it . A worker’s ability also conditions 
his labor market transition probabilities, a set of parameters we consider later in 
Section VIC.
Table 4—Auxiliary Wage Growth Regression (Simulated and Real)
Ed. 7–11 Ed. 12–14 Ed. 15–20
Sim. Real Sim. Real Sim. Real
Residuals
 Standard deviation 0.1229 0.1342 0.1203 0.1271 0.1232 0.1353
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0008)
Within-job residual autocovariance
 Order 1 −0.0041 −0.0045 −0.0044 −0.0042 −0.0043 −0.0037
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
 Order 2 −0.0016 −0.0008 −0.0011 −0.0008 −0.0013 −0.0008
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
 Order 3 −0.0004 −0.0006 −0.0004 −0.0005 −0.0005 −0.0006
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
 Order 4 −0.0003 −0.0006 −0.0003 −0.0004 −0.0004 −0.0005
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; computed by bootstrapping the variance-covariance matrix of the real 
moments (10,000 replications). The estimated slope coefficients on experience, and fit to third and fourth moments 
of distributions, are available on request.
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Table 6 further reports estimates of the parameters of the monthly AR(1) idio-
syncratic productivity process,  ε it . The main feature of those estimates is that they 
are quite similar across all three education groups. We further note that the reported 
AR coefficients are based on a period length of one month and translate into much 
smaller annual coefficients of 0.047, 0.040, and 0.042 for the low-, medium-, and 
 high-education groups, respectively.
B. Firm Heterogeneity
The estimates of the postulated reduced-form relationship (10) between observed 
firm-level value added and the underlying firm type p are reported in the fifth panel 
of Table 6. We note that, as expected, the estimated relationship between observed 
value added and firm type is increasing.
Estimates of the parameters of F( · ) are reported in the second panel of Table 6. 
Perhaps more directly informative are the implied mean and variances of the relating 
sampling distributions. The mean sampled log-productivity is 5.00 for workers with 
7–11 years of schooling, 5.06 for workers with 12–14 years of schooling, and 5.25 
for workers with 15–20 years of schooling (all in log terms). The corresponding 
standard deviations are 0.22, 0.20, and 0.23. Finally, the lower support of F( · ) is the 
parameter  p min  , which is directly available from Table 6.
There appears to be a clear and statistically significant ranking of the three edu-
cation groups in terms of mean sampled productivity, which is also reflected in the 
lower supports of the sampling distributions. The same ranking appears to hold in 
terms of first-order stochastic dominance (see left panel of Figure 3). A similar 
plot is shown on the right panel of Figure 3 of the corresponding  cross-sectional 
distributions of employer types L( p | α), evaluated at the median value of α among 
Table 5—Auxiliary Value Added Equation (Simulated and Real)
Ed. 7–11 Ed. 12–14 Ed. 15–20
Sim. Real Sim. Real Sim. Real
Employment weighted log value added per FTE worker ( y)
 Mean 5.3484 5.3447 5.3379 5.3461 5.5527 5.5532
(0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0023)
 Standard deviation 0.2963 0.3216 0.3261 0.3478 0.3636 0.4000
(0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0018)
log wages, individual level (w)
 Mean 5.1770 5.1707 5.2748 5.2809 5.6518 5.6541
(0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0021)
 Standard deviation 0.2734 0.2641 0.2799 0.2574 0.3496 0.3363
(0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0017)
Correlations and innovations
 Corr( y, w) 0.6103 0.2651 0.6104 0.2631 0.5521 0.2052
(0.0050) (0.0028) (0.0055)
 Standard deviation within-job Δy 0.2246 0.2036 0.2378 0.2124 0.2614 0.2494
(0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0014)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, computed by bootstrapping the variance-covariance matrix of the real 
moments (10,000 replications). Standard errors of Corr( y, w) were computed using the delta method. Fit to third 
and fourth moments of distributions are available on request.
1573bagger et al.: search and wage dynamicsVOl. 104 nO. 6
Table 6—Structural Parameter Estimates: Wages and Productivity
Ed. 7–11 Ed. 12–14 Ed. 15–20
Worker type distribution H(α) =  (0,  σ α 2 )  σ α 0.0659 0.0946 0.1415(0.0262) (0.0066) (0.0113)
Sampling distribution F ( p) = 1 − exp (−[ ν 1 ( p −  ν 0 ) ]  ν  2  )
  ν 0 =  p min (location) 4.8066 4.9202 5.0884(0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0044)
  ν 1 (scale) 5.3796 8.9990 8.1575(0.0015) (0.0000) (0.0002)
  ν 2 (shape) 0.8897 0.7000 0.6924(0.0192) (0.0087) (0.0225)
Productivity shocks  ε it = η  ε it−1 +  u it ,  u it ∼  (0,  σ ε 2)
 η 0.7890 0.7022 0.7325
(0.0189) (0.0112) (0.0372)
  σ u 0.0829 0.0992 0.0934(0.0099) (0.0086) (0.0250)
Workers’ bargaining power
 β 0.3178 0.2985 0.2971
(0.0025) (0.0012) (0.0039)
Value added equation  y jt =  χ 0 +  χ 1  p j +  z jt ,  z jt ∼  (0,  σ P 2)
  χ 0 0.8778 0.4185 0.4308(0.0348) (0.0218) (0.0457)
  χ 1 0.8551 0.9223 0.9256(0.0067) (0.0041) (0.0084)
  σ p 0.1612 0.1709 0.1877(0.0059) (0.0032) (0.0066)
Experience accumulation function g(t) =  γ 1 t +  γ 2  t 2 +  γ 3  t 3 
  γ 1 0.0241 0.0136 0.0268(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006)
  γ 2 × 10 −0.0113 −0.0039 0.0011(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
  γ 3 × 1,000 0.0144 0.0017 −0.0216(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0009)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The monthly discount rate ρ and the monthly attrition 
rate μ are fixed at values of 0.0050 and 0.0018.
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employed workers. L( p | α) is deduced from the estimated sampling distribu-
tions F( p) and transition parameters μ, δ, and  λ 1 (α) using equation (9), that is 
L( p | α) = ( μ + δ)F( p)/[ μ + δ +  λ 1 (α)  _ F ( p)]. The right panel of Figure 3 shows 
that the same FOSD-ordering holds for these cross-sectional distributions, thus con-
firming the presence of positive sorting by education.
C. Labor Market Mobility
The probability that a type-α worker receives a job offer while unemployed is 
 λ 0 (α). If he is employed, the job offer probability is  λ 1 (α). Jobs are destroyed at rate δ, independent of ability (a normalization). When a job is destroyed, a type-α worker 
immediately finds a substitute job with probability κ(α). Hence, the probability of 
a type-α employed worker entering unemployment is δ[1 − κ(α)]. Figure 4 plots 
  λ0 (α),   λ1 (α), and   δ[1 −   κ(α)] as functions of α ∈ [−1.96 ×   σα , 1.96 ×   σα ]. We see 
from Figure 4 that the dependence of individual-level transition probabilities on 
ability has the expected sign: more able workers have higher job offer arrival rates 
both as unemployed and as employed and are less likely to experience unemploy-
ment. This is true for all three education groups. We discuss the implications for 
labor market sorting in the next section.
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Consider the top-left panel in Figure 4 which plots the job offer arrival probabili-
ties for unemployed workers. By assumption, this is also the job finding  probability. 
All three education groups have a small fraction of workers with very low job finding 
probability. These workers are long-term unemployed. At the same time, a rather large 
fraction of the population of workers have a monthly job finding probability close to 
one. These workers find jobs almost instantly when they become unemployed.
The top-right panel in Figure 4 shows the offer arrival probabilities for employed 
workers. These are ordered across education groups as one would expect when we 
consider low-ability workers in each group: higher-educated workers receive offers 
on the job more frequently than less educated workers. However, the slopes are 
steeper for less educated workers, so that high-ability workers tend to have simi-
lar on-the-job offer arrival rates, irrespective of education. Finally, the bottom-left 
panel in Figure 4 plots the job-to-unemployment transition probability. It mirrors the 
on-the-job offer arrival rates, education, and ability providing the expected insur-
ance against unemployment.
Putting together results on worker heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity, and mobil-
ity, we see that the model generates labor market sorting among employed work-
ers separately within each education group. More able workers receive offers 
more frequently and therefore, in steady state, will hold jobs at better employ-
ers than less able workers. Because  λ 1 ′ (α) > 0 a strong form of sorting occurs 
within education groups: the distribution of employer types among workers of 
ability α, L( p | α), is increasing in α in the FOSD sense. We thus capture the spirit 
of the sorting  mechanism introduced by Bagger and Lentz (2012), who estimate 
an equilibrium search model where sorting arises endogenously through workers’ 
heterogeneous choices of search intensity depending on the properties of the match 
production function, worker types, and employer types. In our simplified specifica-
tion, search intensity is exogenous and is only allowed to depend on worker type.
Figure 5 plots L( p | α) for α equal to the 10th, the 50th, and the 90th percentile 
in the population distribution of α, for each of the three education groups, and 
suggests that sorting, as defined above, is a feature of the labor market for work-
ers with low and intermediate education but does not appear in the labor mar-
ket for highly educated workers. This, of course, is just another manifestation of 
the fact, already apparent in Figure 4, that job offer arrival rates are not strongly 
type-dependent among highly educated workers. From Figure 5, it appears that 
within-education group sorting is in fact strongest among workers with the low-
est education. Interestingly, our estimated model suggests that within-education 
group heterogeneity (as measured by  σ α ) among workers and employers is increas-
ing in education. Nonetheless, this increased heterogeneity does not translate into 
increased labor market sorting.
D. Worker Bargaining Power
Our estimates of worker bargaining power β are reported in the fourth panel of 
Table 6 and suggest that workers from all three education groups have virtually 
equal bargaining power, around β ≃ 0.3.
Using Danish data, Bagger, Christensen, and Mortensen (2012) present 
industry- and occupation-specific estimates of workers’ bargaining power 
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parameters in a bargaining model in the spirit of Stole and Zwiebel (1996). They 
find that the bargaining power parameter is difficult to pin down precisely, but the 
range of estimates they present are broadly consistent with the estimates reported in 
Table 6. Closer to us, Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) estimate a model simi-
lar to ours with no experience accumulation on French data. They find that work-
ers in low-skilled occupations have virtually no bargaining power with bargaining 
power increasing from less to more skilled occupations. While there are a number 
of differences between the Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) paper and this 
one (our use of Danish rather than French data, our stratification on education rather 
than occupations, our different way of including firm-level output data in the estima-
tion), to which the discrepancy in bargaining power estimates may be partly attrib-
uted, the most important substantive innovation of this article is the inclusion of 
human capital accumulation into the model. Our results suggest that, once we allow 
for human capital accumulation with different profiles between education groups, 
the model does not need to resort to exogenous differences in bargaining power to 
accommodate differences in wage profiles across education groups.
Even though we find that all education groups have roughly equal bargaining 
power, we should note that a worker’s steady-state share of match output, i.e., the 
piece rate, depends on a number of structural parameters in addition to β, most 
 notably the probability that the worker obtains an outside offer  λ 1 (α) (see (6)). 
Since  λ 1 (α) is higher on average for the intermediate and high education groups, 
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this may offset the lower β for these groups. Indeed, our estimates imply that, for the 
median α in the population, the range (depending on experience t) of steady-state 
shares of output are 0.81–0.83, 0.82–0.85, and 0.81–0.83 for low-, medium-, and 
 high-educated workers, respectively.
E. Human Capital Accumulation
Table 6 finally reports estimates of the deterministic trend in individual human 
capital accumulation, g(t). For added legibility, those trends are also plotted in 
Figure 6. There are qualitative similarities between education categories in human 
capital accumulation patterns. For all education categories, the pace of human capi-
tal accumulation is fastest in the first ten years of a career, after which it slows down, 
giving human capital profiles an overall concave shape.
The quantitative differences between education categories in terms of human 
capital accumulation patterns are striking. Low-educated workers accumulate some 
human capital in their first 15 years, raising their productivity by a total of 15 per-
cent, but this initial gain in productive skills is offset by a subsequent gradual loss of 
productivity, which one may wish to interpret as fatigue or obsolescence. At 30 years 
of experience, cumulated productivity growth for low-educated workers stands at 
10 percent. At the other extreme, workers with more than 15 years of schooling 
grow about 40 percent more productive over the first 25 years of their careers. 
The human capital profile then declines for these highly educated workers toward 
the end of their working lives. At 30 years of experience, the accumulated productiv-
ity growth is still up to around 33 percent. The experience accumulation of work-
ers in the intermediate education group is similar to that of low-educated workers. 
In the next section we look at the implications of these productivity profiles for 
 post-schooling wage growth.
VII. Wage Profile Decomposition
A. Wage Growth
Workers accumulate human capital with experience. At the same time, job-to-job 
transitions tend to gradually reallocate workers to better jobs as they grow more 
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experienced (in spite of reallocation shocks occasionally causing involuntary job 
mobility from high to low productivity jobs). Finally, wages also increase within job 
spells due to contract renegotiations prompted by outside offers.
Making use of the wage equation (7) and the characterization of wage dynam-
ics in (8) we can calculate period-to-period wage growth for each one of the five 
regimes of equation (8) as follows. Conditional on staying employed between expe-
rience levels t and t + 1, expected wage growth Δ w i, t+1 given  p it ,  q it and experience 
t is the sum of three components:
•	 Human	capital	accumulation:
(14)  E (Δ h i, t+1 | t,  p it ,  q it ) =  g (t + 1) − g (t)  __ 
1 − μ − δ (1 − κ) ,
 which is a deterministic function of experience.
•	 Within–job	spell	wage	mobility	(always upward):
(15)    λ 1  __ 
1 − μ − δ(1 − κ)  ∫  q it  
 p it 
 [F (  p it ) − F (x)] ϕ (x) dx.
 Employers give their workers wage increases to keep them from accepting out-
side job offers, thus creating positive apparent returns to tenure.
•	 Voluntary	between-job	wage	mobility:
(16)   λ 1  __ 
1 − μ − δ(1 − κ)  [ ∫  p it   p max   _ F (x)[1 − ϕ (x)] dx +  _ F (  p it )  ∫  q it   p it  ϕ (x) dx ] ,
 where ϕ(x) was defined in equation (6). This is the expected instantaneous 
wage change following a voluntary job mobility. The negative component in 
the first integral, apparent in 1 − ϕ(x), reflects the fact that workers are willing 
to give up a share of the surplus now in exchange for higher future earnings 
when moving from a less to a more productive employer. Yet, on average, this 
negative effect is canceled out and job-to-job mobility is on average associated 
with a wage increase.
•	 Involuntary	between-job	wage	mobility:
(17)  δκ __ 
1 − μ − δ(1 − κ)  [ E p −  p it −  ∫  p min   p max   _ F (x) ϕ (x) dx +  ∫  q it   p it  ϕ (x) dx ] .
 This is the expected instantaneous wage change following an involuntary job 
mobility. In contrast to voluntary job changes, the worker’s outside option is 
unemployment in this case, making wage cuts more frequent.
Finally, the conditioning variables  q it and  p it can be integrated out using the 
equilibrium distributions derived in Appendix A and given in equations (9) above. 
We thus end up with a natural additive decomposition of monthly wage growth (con-
ditional on experience) into a term reflecting the contribution of human capital, two 
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terms reflecting the impact of interfirm competition for workers, both within and 
between job spells, and a term reflecting the impact of reallocation shocks. Search 
frictions and wage renegotiation generate wage/tenure profiles independently of 
human capital accumulation as employers raise wages in response to outside job 
offers as workers receive them.
Figure 7 gives a graphical rendering of that structural decomposition as a function 
of work experience. Figure 7 also plots total wage growth E ( Δ w i, t+1 | t ) . All plots 
are done for workers with median ability  α i = 0. The solid/dashed/ dash-dotted 
lines represent the contributions of between- and within-job wage mobility due 
to between-employer competition for workers, and human capital accumulation, 
respectively. The between-job component includes contributions from voluntary 
and involuntary job mobility.
Experience profiles of all three structural components of wage growth have simi-
lar qualitative shapes across education groups and show that the observed concavity 
of wage-experience profiles results from the combination of a rate of human capital 
accumulation that declines with experience, and a concave impact of movements up 
and down the job ladder. The latter reflects the fact that inexperienced workers tend 
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to start at the bottom of the job ladder, thus facing a relatively high probability of 
sampling better jobs, whereas more experienced workers are likely to be nearer the 
top and have very little chance of drawing offers from even more productive firms.
The contribution of human capital accumulation, reflecting our estimates of g(t) 
(Figure 6), declines more or less steadily throughout the working life in all educa-
tion groups. It is largest for highly educated workers and decreasing with experi-
ence for all three education groups (and becomes negative past 15–20 years of 
experience).
As for the contribution of job search, both the within– and between–job spell 
components also decline with experience, although most of the decline occurs 
within the first ten years of a career. This initial ten-year period can be interpreted as 
the “job-shopping” phase of a working life, during which workers wade their way 
up the job ladder, after which they settle in a high-quality job and use outside offers 
to generate gradual wage increases, reaping the benefits from competition between 
employers. The within-job component (reflecting contract renegotiations within a 
job spell) always dominates the between-job component, especially so toward the 
end of a career. The between-job component eventually becomes negative for highly 
educated workers due to involuntary job mobility.
B. Cumulative Wage-Experience Profiles
To offer a slightly different perspective on career wage dynamics, we can 
further use the structural model for an additive statistical decomposition of 
 wage-experience profiles, as follows. The simple additive structure of our struc-
tural wage equation (7) implies that
(18)  E  ( w it | t ) = E  ( α i | t ) + g (t) + E  ( p it | t ) + E  ( r it | t ) .
Note that mean worker ability among employed workers depends on experience 
through nonrandom selection into employment (since the job finding and layoff 
rates depend on worker ability α), so that E ( α i | t ) is, a priori, not constant across 
experience levels. For notational convenience, we further define w(t) = E ( w it | t ) , α(t) = E ( α i | t ) , p(t) = E ( p it | t ) , and r(t) = E ( r it | t ) . We can then use our estimated 
structural model to simulate all four components of (18): w(t) = α(t) + g(t) + 
p(t) + r(t).
This decomposition is interesting as a way of describing the cross-sectional wage 
distribution among workers of a given experience level. It is also in line with common 
practice in the literature (e.g., Topel 1991; Altonji and Williams 2005; Dustmann 
and Meghir 2005; Altonji, Smith, and Vidangos 2013). Altonji, Smith, and Vidangos 
(2013) propose what is perhaps the richest dynamic model of individual wages, 
mobility, and hours worked estimated to date. It differs from our model in that it 
does not model labor market frictions and their consequences on equilibrium wage 
formation. Figure 1 in that paper decomposes expected career wage growth into 
the sum of the effects of age (potential experience), job tenure, and the gains from 
job shopping as measured by a match-specific random component. They find that 
general human capital explains about 60 percent of wage growth, while tenure and 
job shopping account for approximately equal shares of the remainder. Although the 
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 decomposition of Altonji, Smith, and Vidangos (2013) is similar to ours, it is based 
on a different model and different data, thus rendering further comparison with our 
results difficult.
We present results based on simulations of 100,000 career trajectories. From 
those simulations, it emerged that selection effects are quantitatively negligible, i.e., 
α(t) stays very close to zero at all experience levels. We thus omit that component 
of (18) in the analysis that follows. Figure 8 plots the remaining three components of 
(18), together with the overall wage-experience profile w(t), all normalized at zero 
at one month of experience for readability. Specifically, the figure plots the average 
over 100,000 simulated trajectories of w(t) − w(1), g(t) − g(1), p(t) − p(1), and 
r(t) − r(1), as functions of t.
It is immediately striking from Figure 8 that the average piece rate in a 
cross-section of employed workers of given experience, r(t), is almost constant 
across experience levels. In other words, the wage-experience profile w(t) is almost 
entirely explained by the combination of human capital accumulation, and an 
increasing mean employer type, p(t). On average, more experienced workers earn 
the same piece rate as younger workers but are employed at  higher-productivity 
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firms than younger workers: they receive an equal share of a higher output, and 
thus earn higher wages. As for the role of human capital, Figure 8 confirms that it 
is most important in explaining the wage-experience profiles of the  high-education 
group, where g(t) accounts for about one-half of w(t), roughly on a par with p(t). 
The weight of human capital is smaller in the lower two education groups, where 
g(t) accounts for one-fifth to one-quarter of w(t).
The structural decomposition in Figure 7 revealed that within-job search quan-
titatively dominates between-job search in generating wage growth. However, the 
decomposition in Figure 8 shows that job shopping, i.e., p(t), is quantitatively more 
important than the dynamics in piece rate contracts, r (t), in generating wage growth 
over the life cycle. This reflects the fact that changes to p are cumulative, whereas 
changes to r are not: within a job, the piece rate increases stochastically with experi-
ence, but between jobs, the piece rate may fall as a result of a transition from a less 
to a more productive employer. Those two effects wash out, so that piece rates end 
up being uncorrelated with experience.
The structural wage equation (7) further allows for a decomposition of the cross-
sectional variance of wages, conditional on experience:
(19)  Var  ( w it | t ) = Var  ( ε it | t ) + Var  ( p it | t ) + Var  ( r it | t ) + 2 Cov  ( p it ,  r it | t ) 
 + Var  ( α i | t ) + 2 Cov  ( p it ,  α i | t ) + 2 Cov  ( r it ,  α i | t ) .
The variance and covariance terms involving the fixed worker heterogeneity term 
α i reflect nonrandom selection of worker types into employment. Simulations again 
reveal that those selection effects are very small: Var  ( α i | t ) stays roughly constant, 
and Cov ( p it ,  α i | t ) and Cov ( r it ,  α i | t ) are both very close to zero across experience 
levels. To avoid cluttering the graphs, we omit the latter two covariance terms from 
the following analysis.
Figure 9 then plots the remaining five variance components in (19) plus the over-
all conditional variance. The figure also shows a plot of a nonparametric regres-
sion of log wage variance on experience, constructed directly from the raw data. 
Comparison of the model-predicted conditional log wage variance with the non-
parametric regression line (dotted) shows that the model captures cross-sectional 
wage dispersion very well at all levels of experience for the group of highly edu-
cated workers and has a slight tendency to overstate wage dispersion at high experi-
ence levels in the lower two education groups. This is an encouraging validation of 
the model, as those conditional variances were not among the moments fitted for 
estimation. Figure 9 then reveals that cross-sectional log-wage variance is increas-
ing with labor market experience at a declining rate. Interestingly, this phenomenon 
is driven almost exclusively by increased dispersion in employer productivity, i.e., 
by Var  ( p | t ) .
Figure 9 further indicates that the variance decomposition is similar across edu-
cation groups. There is considerable dispersion in employer types and substan-
tial dispersion in piece rates among a cross-section of employed workers of a 
given experience. Both of those components have sizable positive contributions to 
 cross-sectional wage dispersion. Those positive contributions are partially offset 
by the negative covariance between employer type and piece rate, reflecting the 
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fact that workers are prepared to accept lower piece rates to work at more pro-
ductive employers. The contribution of individual productivity shocks  ε it to wage 
dispersion is comparatively modest, as is the contribution of ability α. Finally, it is 
interesting to observe from Figures 8 and 9 that the conditional variance of piece 
rates, like their conditional mean, does not vary much with experience (it declines 
very slightly).
VIII. Returns to Tenure
Positive “returns to tenure” arise in our structural model because piece rates are 
gradually revised upward within a job spell as workers receive outside job offers. 
The contribution of that mechanism to average wage growth over the life cycle 
is measured by the “within-job wage growth” component plotted on Figure 7. 
This average profile, however, conceals a great deal of heterogeneity. First, returns 
to tenure are firm-specific: one expects more productive employers to offer steeper 
piece rate profiles as there is more scope for upward wage renegotiation at a highly 
productive firm. Second, returns to tenure are not constant: they depend on the point 
Figure 9. log-Wage Component Profiles: Conditional Variance
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on the firm-specific salary scale at which they are evaluated. For example, a worker 
just hired from unemployment tends to receive a relatively low piece rate with a lot 
of scope for future raises, while another worker in the same firm may have already 
negotiated a piece rate close to 100 percent and have very little chance of benefiting 
from further raises within that firm.
To illustrate and quantify both dimensions of heterogeneity, we simulate 
piece-rate tenure profiles for different firm types p and renegotiation thresholds q. 
We select the first, second, and third quartiles of the L( p) distribution as our set 
of firm types p. Then, for each of those p, we consider four different piece rates 
corresponding to q =  p min , and q equal to the first, second, and third quartiles of 
G(q | p), the distribution of renegotiation thresholds within a type-p firm (q =  p min 
yields the piece rate obtained by workers just hired from unemployment). For 
each of those (p, q) pairs we then simulate career trajectories for 100,000 work-
ers over 20 years, switching off job-to-job transitions by assuming that outside 
offers are drawn from F( · ) truncated from above at p. We finally plot average 
piece-rate profiles for each (p, q) pair by averaging over those workers. Results 
are displayed in Figure 10.
As expected, more productive firms tend to offer lower starting piece rates and 
steeper subsequent tenure profiles, with little differences across education groups. 
Furthermore, returns to tenure also depend on worker history: workers with 
lower starting piece rates (lower initial values of q) face higher returns to tenure. 
Differences in initial piece rates are also persistent: in most cases, it takes about 
ten years for piece rates to converge, by which point most workers have left their 
employer to take up a job at a more productive firm (or to become unemployed).
IX. Conclusion
With the purpose of analyzing the sources of individual wage growth, we have 
constructed a tractable equilibrium search model of individual worker careers allow-
ing for human capital accumulation, employer heterogeneity, and individual-level 
shocks, which we estimate on Danish matched employer-employee data. The esti-
mation procedure permits an in-depth comparison of our structural model to com-
monly used reduced-form models in three strands of the empirical labor literature, 
namely the “human capital” literature, the “wage dynamics” literature, and the “job 
search” literature.
The main output of the article is to provide a theoretically founded decomposition 
of individual wage growth into two terms reflecting the respective contributions of 
human capital accumulation and job search, the latter term being further split into a 
between—and a within—job spell component.
The decomposition of individual wage growth is qualitatively similar across 
education groups but reveals that more-educated workers have higher total wage 
growth. This reflects both more-rapid human capital accumulation and, at the early 
stage of a worker’s career, higher returns to job search. We also find that both human 
capital accumulation and job search contribute to the concavity of  wage-experience 
profiles. The contribution from job search to wage growth, both within- and 
 between-job, declines within the first ten years of a career, a period that we identify 
as the “ job-shopping” phase of a working life. Workers subsequently settle into 
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high-quality jobs and use outside offers to generate gradual wage increases, thus 
reaping the benefits from competition between employers. Indeed, the within-job 
component always dominates the between-job component, but especially so after 
ten years of labor market experience.
We supplement the structural decomposition of monthly wage growth by decom-
posing the mean and variance of log wages, conditional on experience level, into 
components of our structural wage equation: worker ability, employer productiv-
ity, human capital, individual-level productivity shocks, and the piece-rate contract. 
The wage-experience profile is almost entirely explained by human capital accu-
mulation and an increasing mean employer productivity (due to “job shopping”). 
Indeed, among highly educated workers, human capital accounts for about half of 
the accumulated growth at all experience levels. The weight of human capital is 
smaller among workers with medium or low education (one-fifth to one-quarter). 
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 Cross-sectional log-wage variance is increasing with labor market experience at 
a declining rate (in the data and in the model). This is almost exclusively driven 
by increased dispersion in employer productivity. The level of log-wage variance 
is explained by dispersion in employer productivity and in piece-rate contracts. 
Dispersion in worker ability and individual productivity shocks contribute only little 
to cross-sectional log-wage dispersion.
Finally, our structural model implies that conventional log wage regression–based 
measures of returns to tenure conceal substantial heterogeneity.
Appendix A: Details of Some Theoretical Results
A. Value Function Derivation
Consider (5) and integrate by parts on the right-hand side to obtain
(A1) V (r,  h t , p) =  w t +  δ _ 1 + ρ  V 0 ( h t ) 
 +  1 _ 
1 + ρ  E t  { (1 − μ − δ)V (r,  h t+1 , p) 
 +  λ 1 β  ∫ p  p max   ∂ V _∂ x  (0,  h t+1 , x)  _ F (x) dx
 +  λ 1 (1 − β)  ∫ q(r,  h t , p) p  ∂ V _∂ x  (0,  h t+1 , x)  _ F (x) dx
 + δκβ  ∫  p min    p max    ∂ V _∂ x  (0,  h t+1 , x)  _ F (x) dx } .
Because the maximum profitable piece rate is r = 0, it follows that q(0,  h t , p) = p. 
Applying (A1) with r = 0 thus yields
(A2) V (0,  h t , p) = p +  h t +  δ _ 1 + ρ  V 0 ( h t ) 
 +  1 _ 
1 + ρ  E t  { (1 − μ − δ )V (0,  h t+1 , p)
 +  λ 1 β  ∫ p  p max   ∂ V _∂ x  (0,  h t+1 , x)  _ F (x) dx 
 + δκβ  ∫  p min    p max   ∂ V _∂ x  (0,  h t+1 , x)  _ F (x) dx } .
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Differentiating with respect to p:
   ∂ V _∂ p  (0,  h t , p) = 1 +  
1 − μ − δ −  λ 1 β  _ F ( p)  __ 
1 + ρ   E t  
∂ V _∂ p  (0,  h t+1 , p),
which solves as
(A3)   ∂ V _∂ p  (0,  h t , p) =  
1 + ρ  __ ρ + μ + δ +  λ 1 β  _ F ( p) .
Substituting into (A1) yields
(A4) V (r,  h t , p) =  w t +  δ _ 1 + ρ  V 0 ( h t ) 
 +  1 _ 
1 + ρ  E t  { (1 − μ − δ)V (r,  h t+1 , p) 
 +  λ 1 β  ∫ p  p max   (1 + ρ)  
_ F (x) dx
  _   ρ + δ + μ +  λ 1 β  _ F (x) 
 +  λ 1 (1 − β)  ∫ q(r,  h t , p) p  (1 + ρ)  
_ F (x) dx
  _   ρ + δ + μ +  λ 1 β  _ F (x) 
 + δκ β  ∫  p min   p max   (1 + ρ)  
_ F (x) dx
  _   ρ + δ + μ +  λ 1 β  _ F (x) } .
B. Derivation of the Mobility Piece Rate
Substitution of (A4) into (3) yields (after rearranging terms):
 r = −(1 − β) [ p − q (r,  h t , p) ] −  λ 1 (1 − β ) 2  ∫ q(r,  h t , p) p  (1 + ρ)  
_ F (x) dx
  _   ρ + δ + μ +  λ 1 β  _ F (x) 
 +  1 − μ − δ _
1 + ρ   E t  [ (1 − β)V  ( 0,  h t+2 , q (r,  h t , p) ) 
 + β V (0,  h t+2 , p) − V (r,  h t+2 , p) ] .
Using the law of iterated expectations, and substituting (3) again within the expecta-
tion term in the latter equation, we obtain
1588 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JuNE 2014
 r = −(1 − β) [ p − q (r,  h t , p) ] −  λ 1 (1 − β ) 2  ∫ q(r,  h t , p) p   
_ F (x) dx
  __  ρ + δ + μ +  λ 1 β  _ F (x) 
 +  (1 − μ − δ)(1 − β)  __ 
1 + ρ  E t  [ V  ( 0,  h t+2 , q (r,  h t , p) ) − V  ( 0,  h t+2 , q (r,  h t+1 , p) ) ] 
 = −(1 − β) [ p − q (r,  h t , p) ] −  λ 1 (1 − β ) 2  ∫ q(r,  h t , p) p   
_ F (x) dx
  __  ρ + δ + μ +  λ 1 β  _ F (x) 
 −  (1 − μ − δ)(1 − β)  __ 
1 + ρ   E t  ∫ q(r,  h t , p) q(r,  h t+1 )  ∂ V _∂ p  (0,  h t+2 , x) dx
 = −(1 − β) [ p − q (r,  h t , p) ] −  λ 1 (1 − β ) 2  ∫ q(r,  h t , p) p   
_ F (x) dx
  __  ρ + δ + μ +  λ 1 β  _ F (x) 
 − (1 − μ − δ)(1 − β) E t  ∫ q(r,  h t , p) q(r,  h t+1 )  dx __ ρ + μ + δ +  λ 1 β  _ F (x) ,
where the last equality uses (A3).
Substitution of (5) into (3) produces the following implicit definition of q( · ):
(A5)  r = −(1 − β) [ p − q (r,  h t , p) ] −  ∫ q(r,  h t , p) p   λ 1 (1 − β ) 
2  
_ F (x) dx
  _ρ + δ + μ +  λ 1 β  _ F (x)  
 −  ∫    ∫ q(r,  h t , p) q(r,  h t+1 , p)  (1 − μ − δ)(1 − β)  __ρ + δ + μ +  λ 1 β  _ F (x)  dx dM ( h t+1 |  h t ),
where M(· |  h t ) is the law of motion of  h t which, up to the deterministic drift g(t), is 
the transition distribution of the first-order Markov process followed by  ε t , as this 
latter shock is the only stochastic component in  h t .
Conveniently, equation (A5) has a simple, deterministic (indeed constant), con-
sistent solution q(r, p) implicitly defined by
(A6)  r = −(1 − β) [ p − q(r, p) ] −  ∫ 
q(r, p) 
p
  
 λ 1 (1 − β ) 2  _ F (x) dx
  _ρ + δ + μ +  λ 1 β  _ F (x)  .
Now even though (A5) implies no direct dependence of q( · ) on t and  h t , other, 
nondeterministic solutions to (A5) may still exist. We ignore the possibility of more 
sophisticated expectational mechanisms in this article and concentrate on the deter-
ministic solution (A6).
C. Derivation of Steady-State Distributions
In this Appendix we derive the joint steady-state cross-sectional distribution 
of two of the random components of wages appearing in (7), namely (  p it ,  q it ). 
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This derivation is useful to simulate the model, which we will need to do when 
implementing our estimation procedure based on simulated moments.
The steady-state assumption implies that inflows must balance outflows for all 
stocks of workers defined by a status (unemployed or employed), a level of expe-
rience t, a piece rate r, and an employer type p. This Appendix spells out the rel-
evant flow-balance equations and the ensuing characterizations of steady-state 
distributions.
Unemployment Rate.—Assuming that all labor market entrants start off at zero 
experience as unemployed job seekers and equating unemployment inflows and out-
flows immediately leads to the following definition of the steady-state unemploy-
ment rate, u:
(A7)  u =  μ + δ (1 − κ)  __  μ + δ (1 − κ) +  λ 0  .
Distribution of Experience Levels.—Denote the steady-state fraction of employed 
(unemployed) workers with experience equal to t by  a 1 (t) ( a 0 (t)). For any positive 
level of experience, t ≥ 1, these two fractions are related by the following pair of 
difference equations:
(A8) ( λ 0 + μ) u a 0 (t) = δ (1 − κ)(1 − u)  a 1 (t)
(A9) (1 − u)  a 1 (t) = [1 − μ − δ (1 − κ)](1 − u)  a 1 (t − 1) +  λ 0 u a 0 (t − 1)
with the fact  a 1 (0) = 0 stemming from the assumed within-period timing of events, 
which implies that employed workers always have strictly positive experience. 
Moreover, the fraction of “entrants,” i.e., unemployed workers with no experience 
a 0 (0), is given by
(A10)  (μ +  λ 0 ) u a 0 (0) = μ.
Jointly solving those three equations, one obtains
(A11)   a 1 (t) =  [ μ +  μδ(1 − κ) _μ +  λ 0   ] [ 1 − μ −  μδ(1 − κ) _μ +  λ 0  ] t−1 .
The corresponding cdf is obtained by summation:
(A12)   A 1 (t) =  ∑ τ=1
t
  a 1 (τ) = 1 −  [ 1 − μ −  μδ(1 − κ) _μ +  λ 0   ] t .
(Note that, as a result of the adopted convention regarding the within-period timing 
of events, no employed worker has zero experience.)  A 0 (t) is then deduced from 
summation of (A8):  A 0 (t) =  μ[μ + δ(1 − κ) +  λ 0 ]__[μ + δ(1 − κ)][μ +  λ 0 ]  +  
δ(1 − κ) λ 0   __ [μ + δ(1 − κ)][μ +  λ 0 ] A 1 (t).
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Conditional Distribution of Firm Types across Employed Workers.—Let L( p | t) 
denote the fraction of employed workers with experience level t ≥ 1 working at a firm 
of type p or less. For t = 1 workers can be hired only from unemployment, imply-
ing that L(p | t = 1) = F( p). For t > 1 workers can come from both employment and 
unemployment, and the flow-balance equation determining L(p | t) is given by
(A13)  L ( p | t)  a 1 (t) =  [ 1 − μ − δ −  λ 1  _ F ( p) ] L ( p | t − 1)  a 1 (t − 1)
 +  [   λ 0 δ(1 − κ)  _μ +  λ 0   + δκ ] F ( p)  a 1 (t − 1).
Since (A11) implies
   
 a 1 (t − 1) _ a 1 (t)  =  [ 1 − μ −  μδ(1 − κ) _μ +  λ 0   ] −1 =  μ +  λ 0   ___  μ +  λ 0 − μ[μ + δ(1 − κ) +  λ 0 ] ,
one can rewrite (A13) as L( p | t) =  Λ 1 ( p)L( p | t − 1) +  Λ 2 F ( p), with:
   Λ 1 (p) =  [1 − μ − δ −  λ 1  
_ F ( p)](μ +  λ 0 )   ___μ +  λ 0 − μ[μ + δ(1 − κ) +  λ 0 ]   and
  Λ 2 =  δ λ 0 + μδκ  ___ μ +  λ 0 − μ[μ + δ(1 − κ) +  λ 0 ] .
This last equation solves as
(A14)  L ( p | t) =  [  Λ 1 ( p ) t−1 +  Λ 2  1 −  Λ 1 ( p ) t−1   _1 −  Λ 1 ( p)  ] F ( p).
Summing over experience levels, we obtain the unconditional cdf of firm types:
(A15)  L ( p) =  (μ + δ)F ( p)  __ μ + δ +  λ 1  _ F ( p) .
Conditional Distribution of Piece Rates.—Equation (6) states that piece rates are 
of the form r = r (q, p). Thus, the conditional distribution of piece rates within a 
type-p firm is fully characterized by the distribution of threshold values q in a type-p 
firm, G(q | p, t), which we now derive. For t > 1, the flow-balance equation deter-
mining G(q | p, t) is given by
(A16) G(q | p, t)ℓ( p | t)  a 1 (t) =  [ 1 − μ − δ −  λ 1  _ F (q) ] 
 × G(q | p, t − 1)ℓ( p | t − 1)  a 1 (t − 1)
 +  λ 1 L(q | t − 1)  a 1 (t − 1) f ( p) + δκ  a 1 (t − 1) f ( p)
 + [μ + δ(1 − κ)] a 0 (t − 1) f ( p),
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where ℓ( p | t) =  L′ ( p | t) is the conditional density of firm types in the population of 
employed workers corresponding to the cdf in (A14). Rewriting this last equation in 
the case q = p, so that G(q | p, t) = 1, yields the differential version of (A13):
(A17)  ℓ( p | t) a 1 (t) =  ( 1 − μ − δ −  λ 1  _ F ( p) ) ℓ ( p | t − 1)  a 1 (t − 1)
 +  λ 1 L ( p | t − 1)  a 1 (t − 1) f ( p) + δκ  a 1 (t − 1) f ( p)
 +  [ μ + δ(1 − κ) ]  a 0 (t − 1) f ( p).
Dividing (A16) and (A17) by f ( p) throughout shows that  G(q | p, t)ℓ( p | t) a 1 (t)  __
f ( p)  and 
 
ℓ(q | t) a 1 (t) _
f (q)  solve the same equation. Hence:
(A18)  G (q | p, t) =  ℓ (q | t)/f (q)  _ℓ ( p | t)/f ( p)   for  q ∈  [  p min , p ] , t > 1.
The unconditional version, (A19), obtains by similar reasoning:
(A19)  G (q | p) =  ℓ (q)/f (q) _ℓ ( p)/f ( p)  =  [  μ + δ +  λ 1  _ F ( p)  __μ + δ +  λ 1  _ F (q)  ] 2 ,  for  q ∈  [  p min , p ] .
Appendix B: Details of the Sample Selection Criteria
Starting from the full MEE, we apply the following selection rules:
•	 We	discard	observations	on	firms	with	missing	firm	 IDs,	missing	ownership	
structure information, or missing industry information (1,141,393 observations 
deleted).
•	 The	raw	spell	data	does	contain	workers	with	gaps	in	their	observed	labor	mar-
ket histories. The deletion of observations on firms with missing IDs, owner-
ship or industry information exacerbates this problem. We remove all workers 
with gaps in their observed labor market histories (23,742,568 observations 
deleted).
•	 We	define	 a	 temporary	 unemployment	 spell	 to	 be	 a	 short	 (viz. 13 weeks or 
shorter) nonemployment, nonretirement spell (i.e., combined unemployment 
and nonparticipation spells), in between job spells with the same employer. 
Temporary unemployment spells are recoded as employment. The recoding 
renders some observations redundant. Furthermore, we define job spells at 
the level of the firm (and not the establishment). However, IDA information 
on employers is recorded at the establishment level, and we thus aggregate 
establishment-specific IDA information to the firm level. In doing so we 
assume that the industry and ownership structure of the firm are those of its 
largest establishment in terms of remaining workers in the analysis data. The 
 establishment-to-firm–level aggregation creates additional redundant obser-
vations. Removing these reduces the analysis data with 6,780,594 observations.
•	 We	keep	only	men	in	the	sample	(41,789,290 observations deleted).
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•	 As	explained	in	the	main	text,	we	discard	workers	born	before	January	1,	1948,	
as these cohorts might have accumulated experience prior to the introduction of 
ATP (14,296,072 observations deleted).
•	 Workers	are	included	into	our	analysis	sample	only	two	years	after	the	date	of	
graduation from their highest completed education. If a worker is ever observed 
in education or if the worker’s education ever changes after the inclusion date, 
all observations on that worker are removed from the dataset. At this point we 
also discard workers with missing or invalid education data. Using information 
on type of the highest completed education we compute education length (in 
years). As a consistency check on the education data we discard any worker 
who is ever observed with years of education exceeding the worker’s age minus 
seven years. In total, we discard 9,793,603 observations at this step.
•	 Labor	market	experience	is	available	on	an	annual	basis	and	refers	to	the	work-
ers’ experience at the end of the calender year. Experience from 1964–1979 
and experience from 1980 and onwards are measured in two distinct vari-
ables.  Pre-1980 experience is measured in years and post-1980 experience in 
1/1,000th of a year’s full-time work. We impose the following consistency 
requirements on the experience data: first, pre-1980 labor market experience 
cannot change during our sample period 1985–2003. Second, workers cannot 
lose experience or obtain more than two years of experience during one cal-
ender year. Finally, total experience can at no time exceed the worker’s age 
minus 15 years. If these requirements are not met the worker is discarded 
(55,387 observations deleted).
•	 We	 truncate	 individual	 labor	 market	 histories	 at	 entry	 into	 retirement	
(546,039 observations and 10,800 workers deleted), a public sector job 
(4,411,620 observations and 107,057 workers deleted), self-employment 
(1,425,075 observations and 36,573 workers deleted), or a job in an industry for 
which we have no accounting data (1,161,373 observations and 46,732 workers 
deleted). Our data thus cover three labor market states: (private sector) employ-
ment, unemployment, and nonparticipation.14
•	 Annual	value	added/FTE observations are transformed into hourly measures by 
scaling annual value added/FTE by 12 × 166.33 hours15 and the  strata-specific 
distributions are trimmed by recoding the top and bottom 1 percent to missing. 
We readjust nominal variables (wages and value added) to the 2003 level using 
Statistic Denmark’s CPI.
•	 The	Master	Panels	contains	data	on	firms’	annual	value	added	which	we	convert	
into an hourly measure. The value added data comes from a survey put together 
by Statistics Denmark using a known sampling scheme, which we must take 
into account by appropriately reweighting moments of the value added distri-
bution. We select the 1999–2003 cross-sections and keep only observations on 
14 Nonparticipation is a residual state (see above) and is not a rare occurrence in our panel: 47 percent 
of the workers in our data experience at least one nonparticipation spell, and, on average, 5.5 percent of the 
 last-week-of-November spells are nonparticipation spells. For this reason we do not truncate labor market histories 
at entry into nonparticipation. However, treating nonparticipation spells as genuine unemployment spells is likely 
to bias our estimates of the job finding rates. Instead, we base our estimation of unemployed workers’ job finding 
rate on genuine unemployment spells only. Job destruction rates are computed using transitions into unemployment 
or nonparticipation.
15 166.33 hours being the monthly norm for a full-time job.
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jobs with wage information. We split the Master Panel observations on employ-
ees into four bins depending on the size of the employer’s workforce (mea-
sured in the raw data, before the selection of the Master Panel): 0–9 employees, 
10–19 employees, 20–49 employees, and more than 49 employees. Statistics 
Denmark’s sampling scheme for the accounting data is such that, within each 
bin, a random sample of employers is selected to submit their accounting data. 
Rather than using the sampling probabilities used by Statistics Denmark, we 
compute from our sample the actual fractions of employees with value added 
information in each bin. These fractions are denoted  ω 1 ,  ω 2 ,  ω 3 , and  ω 4 , and are 
tabulated in Table B1. The empirical sampling probabilities in our Master Panel 
are relatively close to the sampling probabilities applied by Statistics Denmark.
Appendix C: Details of the Simulation Procedure
This Appendix describes the procedure that we implement in order to simulate a 
panel of I workers over T periods given values of the structural model’s parameters. 
In practice, we have used I = 20, 000 and T = 228 months (19 years) in the main 
estimation routine.
We assume that the labor market is in steady state and draw the initial cross-sec-
tion of workers according to the steady-state distributions derived in Appendix A. 
To mimic that the distribution of experience in the initial cross-section is capped 
at 21 years we draw the initial cross-section of the simulated data, conditional on 
experience t ≤ 21 × 12 = 252 months.
We begin with a sample of I workers for which we draw individual (log) hetero-
geneity parameters α from  (0,  σ α 2 ). This fixes the α-dependent transition param-
eters  λ 0 ,  λ 1 , and κ for each of the I simulated workers. Next, we assign labor market 
states (employed or unemployed) to workers according to (A7), and conditional 
on workers’ labor market states we draw labor market experience t, conditional on 
t ≤ 252, according to  A 1 (t) and  A 0 (t) defined by (A12). Given workers’ labor mar-
ket states and experience t we assign employer productivity. Unemployed workers 
are assigned productivity b independent of t while employed workers with experi-
ence t are assigned employer productivity p according to L ( p | t) defined by (A14). 
The productivities of the last firms from which the workers were able to extract the 
Table B1—Sampling Scheme for Accounting Data
Statistics Denmark Empirical sampling probabilities
Labor force size P Years in/out Ed. 7–11 Ed. 12–14 Ed. 15–20
0–9 ( ω 1 ) 0.10 1/9 0.07 0.07 0.09
10–19 ( ω 2 ) 0.20 2/8 0.29 0.29 0.30
20–49 ( ω 3 ) 0.50 3/3 0.62 0.60 0.61> 49 ( ω 4 ) 1.00 — 0.95 0.93 0.91
Notes: P is the theoretical sampling probability. The empirical sampling probabilities are com-
puted from the pooled 1999–2003 last-week-of-November cross-sections. Statistics Denmark 
also include firms with revenue exceeding DKK 100 million (in Wholesale DKK 200 million). 
Statistics Denmark in fact sample 10 percent of firms with five to nine employees and no firms 
with up to four employees (unless revenue is sufficiently high). Still we do observe firms with 
up to four employees and lump them together with firms with five to nine employees.
Source: Matched Employer-Employee data obtained from Statistics Denmark.
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whole surplus in the offer matching game—the qs—are drawn (conditional on p 
and t > 1) from G(q | p, t) defined by (A18). Unemployed workers and employed 
workers with experience t = 1 are assigned q = b. Finally, we draw the value of 
the idiosyncratic productivity shock process—the εs—conditional on labor market 
experience t from  (0,  σ u 2(1 −  η 2t )/(1 −  η 2 )).
We give the following tweak to the draws in the steady-state distributions. Firm 
types p are theoretically distributed according to the continuous sampling distribu-
tion F( p) (Weibull as explained in the main text). Because the theoretical F( · ) 
is continuous, a rigorous implementation of this would invariably produce (finite) 
samples with at most one worker observation per simulated firm type. To get 
round this problem, we discretize F( · ) by taking a fixed number J of firm types 
(in practice we take J = 100), give each of them a rank j = 1, ⋯ , J and assign 
corresponding productivity levels of  p j =  F −1 ( j/(J + 1)).16 Next, to assign the 
p j s to workers (conditional on experience), we draw in the usual way a I-vector ( u 1 , … ,   u I ) of realizations of  [0, 1], and determine worker i ’s firm type as  p j(i, t) = arg mi n x∈{  p 1 , … ,  p J } | L(x | t) −  u i |. Similarly, worker i ’s q is assigned (conditional 
on p =  p j and t > 1) as  q it =  q it ( p j ) = arg mi n x∈{ p 1 , … ,  p j−1 } | G(x |  p j , t) −  v i |, where  v i 
is a draw from  [0, 1]. The resulting cross-section of workers is used as the initial 
state of the labor market for our T-period simulation which produces the final simu-
lated dataset.
The simulation of the labor market careers of the initial cross-section of workers 
is conducted in the following way. At each new simulated period we append the 
following to the record of each individual worker: the worker’s status (employed or 
unemployed), the worker’s experience level, the value of the worker’s productivity 
shock, the worker’s duration of stay in the current job or unemployment spell, and, 
if employed, the worker’s employer type p and threshold value q( · ) determining 
the worker’s piece rate. Furthermore, in accordance with the stipulated relationship 
between firm types and observed value added (see equation (10)), we draw and 
record an idiosyncratic disturbance z from  (0,  σ p 2) for every firm type in every 
period. With this information we can construct a simulated analysis sample contain-
ing the same information as the real analysis sample—namely, unbalanced panels 
with information on earnings, the labor market states occupied, and experience.
In each period, a worker can receive an offer (probability  λ 0 or  λ 1 , depending on 
the worker’s current status), receive a job destruction shock, which may lead to an 
immediate job-to-job transition (probability δκ) or a transition into unemployment 
(probability δ(1 − κ)), or leave the sample (probability μ).17 Each time an unem-
ployed worker receives an offer, we record a change of status, the productivity of 
the new employer18 ( p′ ), an increase in experience, and we set the worker’s duration 
of stay in his current spell to one. Finally, we set q( · ) =  p min . When an employed 
worker (with employer type p) receives an offer, this results in a job-to-job transi-
tion if  p′ > p, in which case we record the productivity  p′ of the new employer, set 
16 Experimenting with the value of J in the estimation revealed that our results are insensitive to different (rea-
sonable) values of J.
17 Recall that  λ 0 ,  λ 1 , and κ are functions of worker ability α.
18 With respect to the sampling of firm types, we let workers draw firm ranks j (and, hence, corresponding pro-
ductivity levels of  p j =  F  −1 ( j/(J + 1))) uniformly in the same J-vector of active firms that was used in the drawing 
of the initial cross-section of workers in the steady-state distributions.
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q( · ) = p, the worker’s tenure at the new firm to one, and increment the worker’s 
experience. In case q( · ) <  p′ ≤ p, the worker does not change firms. However, we 
need to update the worker’s productivity threshold q( · ) to  p′ , and also increment the 
worker’s tenure and experience.19 Finally, workers who leave the sample (probabil-
ity μ) are automatically (i.e., deterministically) replaced by newborn unemployed 
workers with zero experience and new values of α drawn from  (0,  σ α 2 ).
The simulated datasets, which have monthly wage observations (computed using 
(7) and the information recorded for each worker), are remodeled to replicate the 
structure of the actual dataset (which has annual within-job average wage observa-
tions only for the active job spell at the end of November—see Section II). 
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